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Federalism and the Military Power of 
the United States 
Robert Leider* 
This Article examines the original meaning of the constitutional 
provisions governing the raising and organization of military forces. It argues 
that the Framers carefully divided the military between the federal and state 
governments. This division provided structural checks against the misuse of 
military power and made it more difficult to use offensive military force. These 
structural checks have been compromised by the creation of the U.S. Army 
Reserve, the dual enlistment of National Guard officers and soldiers, and the 
acceptance of conscription into the national army, all of which have enhanced 
federal military power beyond its original constitutional limits.  
This Article then explains the relevance of deviations from original 
constitutional design for contemporary legal disputes. Most significantly, 
although the expansion of federal military power has largely come at state 
expense, this expansion has also disturbed the allocation of war powers between 
Congress and the president. In addition, understanding the original division of 
military power is relevant to determining modern limits on Congress’s power to 
raise and regulate the armed forces, including its power to impose military 
criminal jurisdiction on reserve soldiers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “raise and 
support Armies” and to “provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia.”1 Congress has broader power over the armies 
of the United States than it has over the militia.2 For over a century, 
the Supreme Court has held that Congress’s Army Power is plenary and 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 16. 
 2. The Constitution limits Congress’s power to call forth the militia into the service of the 
United States to three cases: executing the laws, suppressing insurrections, and repelling 
invasions. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Federal power over the militia is additionally limited by the 
provision that states appoint the officers, conduct the training, and govern the militia when it is 
not in the service of the United States. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.  
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unrestrained by the limitations in the Militia Clauses;3 that all (or 
nearly all) members of the organized militia—including its officer 
corps—can be required to join the national army;4 and that if Congress 
wants to evade the limitations of the Militia Clauses, Congress can 
deem militiamen to be army soldiers, thereby allowing Congress to 
exercise the same plenary authority over militiamen that it exercises 
over regular soldiers of the United States. This expansive federal 
power, the Court has said, “recognizes the supremacy of federal power 
in the area of military affairs.”5  
This Article challenges that account. The Constitution divided 
military power not only horizontally between Congress and the 
president but also vertically between the federal government and the 
states. The Framers placed three critical limits in the Constitution. 
First, they separated the “Armies” from the “Militia.”6 Second, the 
Framers placed restrictions on the federal government’s use of the 
militia.7 Third, the Framers insulated the militia officer corps from 
direct federal supervision in peacetime by allowing states to select the 
officers.8  
This Article argues that the federal government has undermined 
these three original structural limitations. First, Congress has evaded 
the limitations on its power over the militia through the creation of the 
U.S. Army Reserve. The U.S. Army Reserve is a wholly national militia 
that is accessible to the federal government outside of the three 
purposes enumerated by the Militia Clauses. Second, Congress has 
expanded its authority over the organized militia by requiring members 
of the National Guard to enroll in both the federal military reserve and 
the militia. This “dual enlistment” system has allowed Congress to 
exercise its plenary Army Power over the organized militia. And it has 
subverted the independence of militia officers from the federal 
 
 3. See Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 382 (1918) 
(distinguishing the “constitutional provisions concerning the militia [from] that conferring upon 
Congress the power to raise armies” and noting that Congress retains “complete authority” 
regarding “[t]he army sphere”). 
 4. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 347 (1990) (noting that “every member of the 
Minnesota National Guard has voluntarily enlisted, or accepted a commission as an officer, in the 
National Guard of the United States and [has] thereby become a member of the Reserve Corps of 
the Army”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1) (2012) (defining the “organized militia” as the “National 
Guard” and the “Naval Militia”); 10 U.S.C. § 8904 (2012) (requiring ninety-five percent of naval 
militia members to be members of the U.S. Navy Reserve or U.S. Marine Corps Reserve to receive 
federal support). 
 5. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 351. 
 6. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (authorizing an exclusively federal army), with id. 
art I, § 8, cl. 16 (keeping the militia attached to the states). 
 7. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16. 
 8. Id. art I, § 8, cl. 16. 
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government because states must discharge National Guard officers who 
lose their federal recognition. Finally, Congress has collapsed the 
distinction between the militia and the army by allowing the federal 
government to conscript all able-bodied citizens into the national army. 
Through its power to raise armies,9 the federal government may now 
swallow the entire militia.  
After explaining how the federal government has assumed 
military power originally reserved to the states, this Article explains 
why the federal takeover of the militia matters for a variety of 
contemporary legal disputes. Far from being distinct spheres, the 
division of power horizontally through separation of powers and 
vertically through federalism are intertwined. Most seriously, the 
federal government’s usurpation of state military power has 
destabilized the original horizontal division of military power between 
the president and Congress. The creation of a large military reserve 
force—an exclusively national militia in all but name—has 
substantially broadened presidential power to initiate and conduct 
hostilities without Congress’s ex ante consent.  
Finally, this Article argues for some new modern limits on 
Congress’s power to raise and govern the armed forces based on the 
original understanding of the Militia Clauses. First, the Supreme Court 
should recognize new limits on Congress’s power to conscript. Even 
assuming, arguendo, that Congress has some power of conscription into 
the federal army, Congress undoubtedly lacks the power to conscript 
citizens into federal military reserve forces. A military body comprised 
of conscripted citizens serving in part-time units constitutes a militia 
and thus must be organized pursuant to the Militia Clauses. Second, 
Congress should not be able to apply universal military criminal 
jurisdiction to reserve members of the army.10 Constitutionally, part-
time citizen-soldiers are members of the militia, not the army. 
Consequently, they should not be subject to military law except “when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger.”11    
This Article will have four parts. Part I explicates the general 
division of power between federal and state governments and shows 
 
 9. Id. art I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 10. The arguments in this Article would likely apply to the Air Force because the Air Force 
is part of the constitutional “Armies” of the United States. See 10 U.S.C. § 7001 (2012) (defining 
“Army” as “the Army or Armies referred to in the Constitution of the United States, less that part 
established by law as the Air Force”). The arguments would likely not apply to the naval reserve. 
Congress may have broader power to create and govern part-time naval forces. See infra note 56 
(arguing that the “naval militia” is not part of the constitutional militia); cf. note 344 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that, even if conscription into the army is unconstitutional, 
Congress may have the power to conscript sailors). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:48 PM 
2020] FEDERALISM AND THE MILITARY POWER 993 
how the Framers provided for partially decentralized armed forces. As 
they did with other governmental powers, the Framers paid careful 
attention to ensuring the existence of adequate checks and balances for 
military power. By dividing authority between the federal and state 
governments, the Framers hoped to create adequate fighting forces that 
the United States and the states could use for self-defense and law 
enforcement—while protecting the populace from oppression by either 
state or federal officials. 
In Part II, I argue that Congress lacks the power to create an 
army reserve. Federal law currently requires all federally funded, 
organized militia members to simultaneously enroll in the National 
Guard of a state, which is the organized militia of that state, and in the 
“National Guard of the United States,” which is a reserve component of 
the armed forces.12 The Supreme Court unanimously assumed the 
validity of this arrangement in Perpich v. Department of Defense,13 a 
case that, although not formally upholding dual enlistment, leaves little 
doubt that the Supreme Court accepted its constitutionality. Dual 
enlistment, however, is unconstitutional. The U.S. Army Reserve is an 
organized militia. It is not part of the “armies” described in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 12, which referred to land forces comprising regular 
troops. Because the U.S. Army Reserve is a militia, it is subject to the 
constitutional constraints imposed by the Militia Clauses, including 
restrictions against the federal government calling forth the militia and 
the requirement that states appoint the officers.14 Congress cannot 
evade these limitations simply by labeling the force the “U.S. Army 
Reserve.” Correlatively, Congress cannot evade the limitations on 
federal use of the militia by having National Guardsmen 
simultaneously enlist in both the militia and the U.S. Army Reserve. 
Third, I argue that, a fortiori, Congress cannot constitutionally require 
militia officers to enroll in the U.S. Army Reserve. The Framers 
intended that officers of the militia would constitute a separate chain 
of command, one not under federal control except when in the actual 
service of the United States. By requiring officers of the militia to enroll 
in the federal army, Congress has subverted this structural limitation. 
In Part III, I explain why Congress likely lacks a power of 
conscription, which the Supreme Court first upheld in the Selective 
 
 12. For laws governing enlisted personnel in this regard, see 32 U.S.C. §§ 301, 322 (2012). 
For those governing officers in this regard, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 12211, 12212 (2012); 32 U.S.C. § 324 
(2012). 
 13. See 496 U.S. 334, 350 (1990) (“Over the years, Congress has exercised this power in 
various ways, but its current choice of a dual enlistment system is just as permissible as the 1792 
choice to have the members of the militia arm themselves.”). 
 14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16. 
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Draft Law Cases.15 My argument is structural. The Constitution 
restricted the federal government’s ability to call forth the militia to 
three activities: executing the laws, suppressing insurrections, and 
repelling invasions. After the Selective Draft Law Cases, however, these 
checks became mostly meaningless because the federal government 
could label the militia as an “army” and then exercise plenary control.16 
My argument is that Congress cannot evade the limitations on its 
Militia Power simply by relabeling the militia as an army. This Part 
also argues that, even assuming Congress has some power of 
conscription, Congress lacks the power to draft soldiers into a federal 
reserve army. Shortly after the Framing, Congress debated what 
distinguished a “militia” from an army. Some argued that a militia was 
conscripted, while an army comprised volunteers; others argued that a 
militia comprised part-time citizen-soldiers while an army comprised 
regular soldiers.17 Under either approach, a conscripted, part-time 
fighting force is a “militia.” 
Part IV addresses the broader implications for the destruction of 
federalism-based checks on contemporary disputes. This Part examines 
how the destruction of military federalism affects federal-state 
relations, separation of powers, and the constitutional limits of federal 
military criminal jurisdiction. Its primary theme is that originalists 
must engage in a “second-best originalism” in response to pervasive 
deviations from original constitutional design. For example, the 
destruction of federalism-based checks has enlarged the power of the 
president well beyond what the Framers intended and diminished the 
power of Congress. Originalists who call for a robust, preclusive 
Commander-in-Chief Power need to account for how deviations from 
military federalism have enhanced the president’s unilateral power. On 
this view, laws such as the War Powers Act may help rebalance 
horizontal separation of powers in line with the Framers’ original 
intent. Originalists will also need to engage in second-best originalism 
when examining the constitutional limits of military criminal 
jurisdiction over reservists, whom the Framers would have classified as 
militiamen rather than as regular soldiers.  
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF MILITARY POWER 
The Constitution splits power based on three principles. The 
first is separation of powers, which is the formal separation of 
 
 15. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
 16. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 347–48. 
 17. See infra notes 361–375. 
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legislative, executive, and judicial power into separate governmental 
departments.18 The second is checks and balances, which use the partial 
“intermingling of functions in order to permit the branches to provide a 
check on their counterparts.”19 And the third is federalism, which is 
based on “the unique insight that freedom is enhanced by the creation 
of two governments, not one.”20 
The Constitution divides the military power along all three lines. 
Horizontally, the Framers divided power over the military between 
Congress and the president, both separating functions and providing 
checks. For example, the Constitution gave Congress the powers to 
raise armies, provide for a navy, organize the militia, declare war, 
regulate the armed forces, and tax and appropriate money for military 
affairs.21 The president was made commander in chief of the military 
and had the power to appoint the officers with the Senate’s consent.22 
Less appreciated, however, is that federalizing the military was 
another way in which the Framers divided the military power.23 The 
vertical division of military power resulted from conflict and 
compromise about what kind of forces the country should rely on for 
national defense. In principle, most Framers preferred maintaining a 
militia over having a standing army. The Framers were concerned that 
professional soldiers could become tools of governmental oppression, 
and prevailing republican sentiment disfavored the maintenance of 
standing armies in times of peace. But the Framers also recognized that 
standing armies were more practical for national defense. Citizen-
soldiers were often more citizen than soldier. The lack of preparation, 
discipline, and coordination among American forces during the 
Revolutionary War had nearly led to defeat against the British 
regulars. 
The compromises over the Constitution’s military clauses derive 
from the Framers’ desire to gain the benefits of having both professional 
soldiers and an armed citizenry—that is, to have a strong national 
defense without risking national oppression. To do this, the 
Constitution created two interoperable—but partially separate—
military structures: first, full-time professional servicemen under 
plenary federal control; and second, citizen-soldiers who would be 
 
 18. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 
1522–24 (1991). 
 19. Daniel Epps, Checks and Balances in Criminal Law, 74 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 19) (on file with author). 
 20. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11–14, 16. 
 22. Id. art. II, § 2. 
 23. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1496 (1987). 
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organized into a hybrid national-state militia system. The Framers 
then used the partial separation of these forces both to limit federal 
military power and to provide checks against the use of illegitimate 
force by private parties, state actors, and federal officials. 
This Part has four sections. Section A will examine the decision 
to grant Congress plenary authority to raise a professional military. 
Sections B and C will examine the militia. Section B will describe the 
federal character24 of the militia system and argue that the Framers 
mostly nationalized the militia. Section C will explain some of the 
practical legal implications of the militia’s federal character. Finally, 
Section D will explain how the Framers intended the division of 
authority over the professional military and the militia to contribute to 
a system of military checks and balances. 
A. Professional Forces 
The Framing generation generally opposed maintaining full-
time professional soldiers, especially in peacetime. In part, these 
objections were philosophical. Many thought the profession of arms was 
incompatible with republican civic virtue.25 Professional soldiers make 
it their career to become proficient in the skill of killing other human 
beings.26 Professional soldiers also could not be trusted to preserve free 
government.27 Regular soldiers were subject to constant military 
discipline and were thereby removed from the freedoms enjoyed by the 
republican political community that they were defending.28 Worse, 
 
 24. By “federal character” I mean that the federal and state governments share authority 
over the militia. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 244–46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (distinguishing “national character” from “federal character”). When I use this phrase, 
I do not mean that the militia is a military force belonging to the federal government alone. 
 25. CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR 354–56 (1979) (noting the belief 
that officers could be “trained to monarchy by military habits”). 
 26. Cf. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413–14 (noting that even troops’ 
entertainment is hunting because it resembles killing). 
 27. See Massachusetts Convention Debates (February 1, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1390, 1396, 1399–1400 (John P. Kaminski et 
al. eds., 2000) (statement of Nasson in Massachusetts ratifying convention) (describing standing 
armies as the “bane of republican governments”); Albany Antifederal Committee, N.Y.J., Apr. 26, 
1788, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 337, 337 (David E. Young ed., 1991) 
(objecting against “[t]he power to raise, support, and maintain a standing army in time of peace” 
as “[t]he bane of a republican government” in that standing armies have reduced “most of the once 
free nations of the globe . . . to bondage”); see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE 
STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 20–21 (1964) (noting that officers 
prior to 1800 generally were mercenaries, who viewed officership as a business rather than a 
profession and who judged success by monetary standards). 
 28. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *416–17 (“These men . . . seeing the liberty 
which others possess, and which they themselves are excluded from, are apt . . . to live in a state 
of perpetual envy and hatred towards the rest of the community . . . .”). 
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armies were often composed of unsavory characters, sometimes 
impressed into service.29 For these reasons, the Framing generation 
viewed professional soldiers as unreliable guardians of free 
government.30 The Framers also had practical objections to having a 
standing army. Professional soldiers are maintained at public expense, 
and paying and equipping regular troops is burdensome.31 
The Framing generation’s objections to standing armies largely 
derived from over a century of conflict. In the seventeenth century, 
English monarchs had used the army and other volunteer forces, which 
belonged solely to the Crown, to attack Parliament and religious and 
political opponents.32 As Frederic Maitland explains, “England came 
under the domination of the army” during the English Civil Wars.33 
Following those conflicts, King Charles II formed a select militia, and 
many feared that he would disband Parliament and rule using the 
army.34 These actions, and others, led to popular hatred of standing 
 
 29. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 53 (1998) 
(“These men, full-time soldiers who had sold themselves into virtual bondage to the government, 
were typically considered the dregs of society—men without land, homes, families, or principles.”); 
CORRELLI BARNETT, BRITAIN AND HER ARMY 1509–1970: A MILITARY, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
SURVEY 41–42 (1970) (describing an impressment system that generally caused drunks, criminals, 
and the idle to be enlisted into the professional army). 
 30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299 (James Madison) (discussing how many 
regular soldiers can be raised by a populace); 3 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 50 (P.F. 
Collier & Son 1909) (1776) (discussing how countries “pay[ ] the expense of [these soldiers’] service” 
and how this is financially burdensome). 
 32. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 29, at 73–78 (recounting the history of King Charles I’s 
power struggles with Parliament between 1639 and 1642); F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 326 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1908) (describing fears that King 
Charles I would overthrow Parliament using the standing army). 
 33. MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 326. 
 34. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT 63 (1994) (discussing the formation of the “select militia” and the articles of 
impeachment against Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, who was accused of telling the king to 
effectively replace Parliament with a standing army). A “select militia” is the older terminology for 
“organized militia.” Like today’s “organized militia” (e.g., the National Guard), the select militia 
was a subset of the entire political community capable of bearing arms. Often this subset 
voluntarily enlisted, though occasionally it was drafted by lots. See generally BARNETT, supra note 
29, at 34 (discussing the formation of “trained bands” in England); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, 
at *412 (describing the system of organizing part of the militia with organized militiamen chosen 
by lots). 
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armies and select militias among England’s political elite.35 The 
American Founding generation shared that distrust.36 
Yet, the opposition to a professional military was not absolute. 
Virtually all the Framers recognized the need to have some regular 
soldiers.37 The United States had frontiers to protect and garrisons to 
guard, which required at least a small, but constant, military presence 
in times of peace.38 The country also needed a navy.39 And a state-based 
militia system created several practical problems, including states 
improperly training and supervising their militias and state 
governments unwilling to send militias to suppress insurrections.40 
Thus, while many in principle preferred the militia to the army, the 
 
 35. See MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 326 (“At the Restoration the very name of a standing 
army had become hateful to the classes which were to be the ruling classes.”); Russell F. Weigley, 
The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present, 
in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 215, 219 
(Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001) (“In reaction to Cromwell and the Stuarts, 
however, there emerged an English national tradition of suspicion of the military as an intrinsic 
threat to civilian self-government and liberties.”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 592–93 (2008) (noting that King Charles II’s “order[ing] [of] general disarmaments of regions 
home to his Protestant enemies” made the English “extremely wary of concentrated military forces 
run by the state and . . . jealous of their arms”). 
 36. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598–99 (“During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the 
Federal Government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or 
select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric.”); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 
156–57 (1840) (recounting the English history as providing the primary impetus for preferring 
armed citizens for collective defense); Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
29, 73 (2005) (“To many observers, the British regulars who arrived in Boston in October 1768 to 
enforce the Townshend duties signified the danger of a military no longer under the control of the 
people. . . . By the fall of 1774, opposition to professional soldiering had reached national 
proportions.”); Weigley, supra note 35, at 219 (“The American colonists fully accepted the Whig 
antimilitary tradition and indeed integrated it into American political culture.”). 
 37. See Mazzone, supra note 36, at 73 (“Eighteenth-century Americans were not opposed to 
armies entirely, and the wisdom of professional military training was widely appreciated.”). Even 
Elbridge Gerry and George Mason, who were so adamantly opposed to standing armies that they 
refused to sign the Constitution in part for that reason, recognized the need for some troops. See, 
e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 633 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter RECORDS] (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (noting that the Constitution permitted the 
federal government unlimited power to raise troops). Gerry unsuccessfully tried to limit the 
number of troops maintained in time of peace to two or three thousand. 2 RECORDS, supra, at 329–
30. Mason understood the need for troops but wanted some declaration about the dangers of 
standing armies. 2 RECORDS, supra, at 616–17. Charles Pinckney introduced language to prohibit 
keeping troops in time of peace except with the legislature’s consent and limiting the 
appropriations for “military land forces” for one year. See 2 RECORDS, supra, at 323, 329, 341. 
 38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing both the 
necessity of and the problem of manning the garrisons); HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 166–67. 
 39. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 450. 
 40. See id. at 330, 332 (statements of Charles Pinckney) (noting that the lack of militia 
discipline caused problems both during the Revolutionary War and during Shay’s Rebellion); id. 
at 387 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (observing that “the Militia were every where neglected 
by the State Legislatures, the members of which courted popularity too much to enforce a proper 
discipline”); id. (statement of James Madison) (“The States neglect their Militia now . . . .”). 
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Framing generation still widely recognized (even if many begrudgingly 
accepted) that having some professional soldiers was necessary for 
national defense. 
Not all Framers viewed a standing army as a necessary evil. 
Some—most vocally Alexander Hamilton and George Washington—
accepted the legitimacy of professional soldiers. They recognized that 
the art of war requires practice to achieve proficiency.41 And the militia 
was unreliable. Ordinary citizens resented being pulled away from their 
homes to train and fight, especially for long periods of time.42 Lacking 
the virtues of good soldiers, ordinary citizens often acted incompetently 
in battle.43 Hamilton further argued that, although a professional army 
was costly to maintain, so too was a universal militia; equipping and 
disciplining the entire able-bodied citizenry bore high actual and 
opportunity costs.44 
The Framers ultimately decided to substantially broaden 
Congress’s military power. Under the Articles of Confederation, there 
was “doubt . . . whether Cong[ress] . . . ha[d] a right to keep Ships or 
 
 41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 24, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton) (“War, like 
most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, 
and by practice.”); 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 56; Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 
1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
27, at 1258, 1278–79 (statement of Nicholas) (questioning the adequacy of “men unacquainted with 
the hardships, and unskilled in the discipline of war”); see also RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 74 (1967) (quoting George Washington as demonstration of his belief 
“that the military experience of the Revolution proved America’s need for a professional army”).  
 42. See, e.g., Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1278–79 
(statement of Nicholas); Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 
1776), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 106, 110 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1932) 
(describing relying on the militia as “resting upon a broken staff,” especially considering how it 
consisted of “[m]en just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life”); see also 3 RECORDS, 
supra note 37, at 172, 207–08 (statement of Luther Martin to the Maryland ratifying convention) 
(explaining that he refused to sign the Constitution, among other things, because of the possible 
burdens placed on militiamen and the refusal to limit the size of the standing army to what was 
necessary). 
 43. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 24, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted 
by a force of the same kind.”); 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 56; Debates of the Virginia Convention 
(June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1278–79 (statement of Nicholas) (questioning whether the 
country would be safe with solely a militia upon invasion and stating that the “inadequacy [of a 
militia] is proved by the experience of other nations”); Letter from George Washington to the 
President of Congress (Sept. 15, 1780), in 20 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 
42, at 49–50 (distinguishing the troops of a militia from those of an army); see also WEIGLEY, supra 
note 41, at 74 (quoting George Washington as saying, “No Militia will ever acquire the habits 
necessary to resist a regular force. . . . The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is 
only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service”). 
 44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 182–83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To oblige the 
great body of the yeomanry . . . to be under arms . . . . would form an annual deduction from the 
productive labor of the country, to an amount which . . . would not fall far short of the whole 
expense of the civil establishments of all the States.”). 
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troops in time of peace.”45 The Constitution settled this question in the 
affirmative, granting Congress broad power to “raise and support 
Armies”46 and to “provide and maintain a Navy.”47 Despite the Framing 
generation’s consternations about standing armies, those in favor of a 
broad military power defeated attempts during the Constitutional 
Convention to limit the Army Power. These proposals included limiting 
the number of troops that the federal government could raise and even 
cautionary declarations about the dangers of standing armies.48 Later, 
during discussion over the Bill of Rights, the Framers refused to adopt 
proposals to require a supermajority of Congress before keeping 
professional troops in time of peace.49 The only adopted limitation on 
the Army Power was that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall 
be for a longer Term than two Years,”50 which facilitated Congress 
periodically debating whether to continue funding a standing army. 
With less controversy, the Framers continued restrictions 
against states having professional militaries. The Articles of 
Confederation had prohibited states from maintaining “vessels of war” 
or “any body of forces” in peacetime, with narrow defensive exceptions 
that had to be approved by Congress.51 The states, however, did not 
faithfully follow these prohibitions.52 At the Constitutional Convention, 
the delegates reaffirmed the prohibition against professional soldiers 
and sailors, with no serious debate about removing them. Hamilton 
proposed early that “[n]o state [shall] have any forces land or Naval.”53 
James Madison noted that an uneven distribution of military force 
among the states could allow a minority of states with more military 
 
 45. 1 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 287. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 47. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 48. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 49. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780–81 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (1789) (rejecting a proposal to 
add a two-thirds requirement for standing armies in times of peace to what is now the Second 
Amendment); see also Maryland Ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 729, 735 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) (“That no standing army shall 
be kept up in time of peace, unless with the consent of two thirds of the members present of each 
branch of Congress.”); New Hampshire Ratifying Convention, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 758, 761 (proposing a requirement that three-fourths 
of the legislature approve a peacetime army). 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 505. 
 51. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, para. 4. In contrast to its general 
prohibitions against states maintaining professional land and naval forces, the Articles of 
Confederation made states duty-bound to maintain their militia. Id.  
 52. 1 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 316 (complaining that Massachusetts had raised troops 
without even notifying Congress). 
 53. Id. at 293. 
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might to rule over the majority.54 After some minor stylistic revisions,55 
this became a prohibition against states “keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of 
War in time of Peace” without Congress’s consent.56 
Thus, the first part of military federalism relates to the 
professional military services. The Constitution grants near-plenary 
control over the professional army and the navy to the federal 
government. The federal government may raise armies and provide for 
a navy. States, in contrast, are forbidden to do these things, except in 
time of war or with Congress’s consent. 
B. (Mostly) Nationalizing the Militia 
This Section describes the constitutional organization of the 
militia. Despite the ubiquity of referring to the militia as “the state 
militia,” I argue that the Constitution transformed the American 
militia system into a primarily national military auxiliary to the 
professional forces. This national system, however, still contained some 
important limitations on Congress’s power. I will argue in subsequent 
Parts that Congress has improperly used its Army Power to subvert 
these limitations. 
The partial nationalization of the militia resulted from the 
failure of a true state-based system under the Articles of Confederation. 
The Articles left a critical gap between power and responsibility.57 The 
Articles left the making of war to Congress,58 but Congress had to rely 
on state militias as the peacetime national defense force.59 On paper, 
the Articles of Confederation obliged states to maintain a well-
regulated militia.60 In practice, however, the states neglected that 
 
 54. Id. at 318. 
 55. For proposals and variations on the final language, see 2 id. at 169, 577, 597, 626. 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Beginning in 1891, Congress has provided funds “for naval 
militia of various States,” An Act Making Appropriations for the Naval Service, ch. 494, 26 Stat. 
799, 801 (1891), and in 1894, authorized federal loans of equipment for such organizations, An Act 
to Promote the Efficiency of the Naval Militia, ch. 192, 28 Stat. 219, 219 (1894). In 1914, Congress 
recognized the “Naval Militia” as part of the organized militia. 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1) (2012); An Act 
to Promote the Efficiency of the Naval Militia, ch. 21, 38 Stat. 283, 283 (1914). Today, a few states 
continue to maintain a “naval militia.” But whether a “naval militia” is part of the constitutional 
“Militia” seems dubious. A naval militia requires a state to maintain ships of war. And that, in 
turn, requires congressional consent under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Given this, the 
“naval militia” is likely not part of the constitutional “Militia,” but rather a separate state navy. 
And if that is true, the maintenance of such organizations depends strictly on Congress’s consent; 
states have no inherent power to organize or arm a naval militia. 
 57. Mazzone, supra note 36, at 76–77. 
 58. Id. at 76. 
 59. WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 82–85. 
 60. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, para. 4. 
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duty.61 In response, the Constitution transformed the militia. The 
Framers created a hybrid national-state militia system. The states lost 
most policymaking authority regarding the militia, though they 
retained control of the militia except in cases of national emergency.62 
The national-state hybrid system was the product of compromise 
at the Convention.63 The Militia Clauses originated with Charles 
Pinckney’s plan to provide Congress with “the exclusive Right of 
establishing the Government and Discipline of the Militia . . . and of 
ordering the Militia of any State to any Place within [the] U.S.”64 
Eventually, this provision evolved into a few distinct proposals, 
including one from George Mason on August 18, 1787, that would give 
the federal government the power to provide uniformity in the arming 
and disciplining of the militia, while reserving the appointment of 
officers to the states.65 In considering Mason’s proposal, the delegates 
began to fracture in their views. Mason and Pinckney sought uniformity 
in the militia because of problems encountered during the 
Revolutionary War in having dissimilar forces trying to fight alongside 
each other.66 James Madison and Pierce Butler wanted to go further: 
because the militia involved “public defence” (or, in Butler’s words, 
“general defence”), the militia ought to belong entirely to the federal 
government, which was charged with providing for the common 
defense.67 George Read disagreed with reserving the appointment of 
militia officers to the states; though if the Convention insisted on this, 
Read wanted the officers appointed by state governors, rather than by 
state legislatures or popular election.68 
While Madison and Butler called for a fully national militia, few 
at the Convention advocated for the other extreme: leaving the militia 
under the plenary authority of the states.69 George Mason, certainly one 
of the most ardent supporters of states’ rights during the Convention, 
supported regulating the militia at the national level.70 Oliver 
 
 61. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 387 (statement of James Madison) (“The States neglect 
their Militia now . . . .”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 63. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 329–33 (surveying the debate that produced the current 
system). 
 64. Id. at 159. 
 65. Id. at 330. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 331–32. 
 68. Id. at 333. 
 69. Luther Martin later claimed to have advocated for state control. See Luther Martin, 
Genuine Information VII, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 1788, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 410–12. 
 70. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 326. 
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Ellsworth came closest to advocating state control when he cautioned 
against giving to the federal government “[t]he whole authority over the 
Militia.”71 
Despite broad agreement to increase federal power over the 
militia, the delegates disagreed about exactly how much authority the 
states should retain. Arguing against Madison’s strong nationalist 
views, Ellsworth wanted to avoid removing the “whole authority over 
the Militia . . . from the States whose consequence would pine away to 
nothing.”72 Roger Sherman also noted that states may need their militia 
“for defence [against] invasions and insurrections, and for enforcing 
obedience to their laws.”73 As a result, he also argued against a complete 
federal takeover.74 But even Ellsworth proposed giving the federal 
government direct control over the militia within a state whenever the 
state neglected its militia.75 
The Convention resumed debate on the Militia Clauses on 
August 23, when the Committee of Eleven proposed a Militia Clause 
that, with minor stylistic changes, would become Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 16.76 As in the August 18 debate, the fractured views of the 
Convention surfaced. Madison strenuously argued that the militia was 
a matter of “National concern” and should belong to the national 
government.77 Jonathan Dayton, Ellsworth, and Sherman offered 
proposals that would give the states more power over the militia, while 
still giving the federal government a limited power to ensure 
uniformity.78 Edmund Randolph supported the proposal of the 
Committee of Eleven, which he thought was an acceptable compromise 
as-is. He complained that the states neglected their militia and that 
reserving the appointment of the officers to the states “protects the 
people [against] every apprehension that could produce murmur.”79 
But Madison was not willing to let go of his attempts to 
nationalize the militia as much as possible. Immediately after 
Randolph’s attempt to lobby for the Committee’s proposal as an 
acceptable compromise, the Convention voted.80 Faced with losing his 
proposal to have a complete federal takeover of the militia, Madison 
 
 71. Id. at 331. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 332. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 384–85. 
 77. Id. at 387. 
 78. Id. at 385–86. 
 79. Id. at 387. 
 80. Id. at 387–88. 
Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:48 PM 
1004 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:989 
then proposed having the federal government appoint the generals; the 
states would appoint officers under that rank.81 But his proposal met 
fierce resistance. Sherman thought that “allow[ing] the Most influential 
officers of the Militia to be appointed by the [General] Government” 
would consolidate a dangerous amount of military power in one 
government.82 Elbridge Gerry, after sarcastically suggesting that the 
Convention might as well abolish state governments, warned “[against] 
pushing the experiment too far.”83 Madison did not back down. He felt 
that only the federal government would adequately provide for the 
militia, and having a disciplined militia was the best way to avoid the 
need for a large standing army.84 Ultimately, Madison lost the vote 
three states to eight, with only New Hampshire, Georgia, and South 
Carolina supporting him.85 
As a product of these debates, the Constitution granted Congress 
plenary authority “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, 
the Militia.”86 Through this provision, the Framers wanted the highest 
level of uniformity within the militia as was practicable. Mason said 
that “[h]e considered uniformity as necessary in the regulation of the 
Militia throughout the Union.”87 Furthering Mason’s point, Pinckney 
noted that, “during the [Revolution] . . . dissimilarity in the militia of 
different States had produced the most serious mischiefs. Uniformity 
was essential.”88 There were some dissenting views on whether the 
militia should have “so absolute a uniformity” across states: Dayton 
noted that some areas might need more cavalry or require rifles instead 
of muskets.89 But whether the militia was absolutely uniform or mostly 
uniform across states, the basic point was the same: the transformation 
of the separate state militias into a national defense force. 
The Constitution charges the states primarily with ministerial 
duties regarding the militia. First, they have the responsibility to train 
the militia, although this authority extends only to “the discipline 
prescribed by Congress.”90 As Gerry mocked during the Convention, the 
 
 81. Id. at 388. 
 82. See id. (statement of Roger Sherman). 
 83. Id. (statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 87. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 330. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 386. 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
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states became the “drill-sergeants.”91 Second, states have the authority 
to appoint the officers.92 
This is not to say, however, that these tasks exhaust the state’s 
jurisdiction over its militia. A state’s militia, while not in the actual 
service of the United States, is available for all appropriate uses to 
which a militia may be put (e.g., assisting state law enforcement when 
the civil authorities are inadequate).93 Likewise, a state has concurrent 
authority to discipline its militia.94 But this power must be carefully 
characterized: while a state has concurrent authority to supplement 
federal militia law (e.g., to provide for arming its militia if Congress 
does not so provide), a state almost never has preclusive power to 
contravene federal militia legislation.95 To analogize from Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case,96 states have a category 
two power over the militia (complementary authority to Congress), but 
almost never a category three power (inherent preclusive power).97 
David Yassky argues that, even after the Constitutional 
Convention, the militia remained primarily a state institution. He 
points to a few features of the militia system. First, operational 
 
 91. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 385. As I explain below, Gerry’s statement is a bit of an 
exaggeration, but it captures the substantial diminution of state control over the militia. See text 
accompanying infra note 103. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. The militia is a textually committed counterexample to 
Printz v. United States’s general anticommandeering principle: it is one of three instances stated 
in the Constitution where Congress can (1) dictate a mandatory policy not connected to any federal 
funding; and (2) delegate to state officials—not the president—the execution of that policy. See, 
e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–25 (1997) (announcing the principle). The other 
two counterexamples are the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (granting Congress the 
power to alter state election law concerning congressional elections), and the Supremacy Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (binding state court judges). Indeed, the militia system may also be an 
exception to the rule announced in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992), that 
Congress cannot compel states to enact certain kinds of legislation. 
 93. Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 1299, 1304 (statement of James 
Madison). 
 94. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1820). 
 95. Id. at 16–17: 
But as State militia, the power of the State governments to legislate on the same 
subjects, having existed prior to the formation of the constitution, and not having been 
prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the States, subordinate nevertheless to 
the paramount law of the general government, operating upon the same subject. 
See generally J. Norman Heath, Exposing the Second Amendment: Federal Preemption of State 
Militia Legislation, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 39 (2001) (arguing that courts have not interpreted 
the Second Amendment to give states the power to contravene federal legislation governing the 
militia). 
 96. For Jackson’s categories, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 
U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 97. The federal government could not directly commission the officers or conduct the training 
of the militia, but that probably exhausts the list of activities that would fall within the state’s 
preclusive power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
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governance of the militia occurred only during the limited times that 
the federal government called forth the militia, and federal governance 
was limited to the times that the militia was in “actual service.”98 
Second, the Constitutional Convention reserved to the states the 
appointment of all officers and the authority of training.99 Yassky notes 
that the Convention even beat back Madison’s modest attempt to 
provide federal appointment of general officers.100 Third, the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause states that the president is “Commander 
in Chief . . . of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States.”101 From this, he concludes that 
“[e]ven when undertaking national tasks under the direction of the 
President, the militia remain ‘of the several states.’ ”102 
Yassky’s conclusion that the militia “remain ‘of the several 
states’ ” overstates state control over the militia following the adoption 
of the Constitution. Congress had full authority to dictate the militia’s 
structure, weapons, and discipline. The militia remained a “state 
militia” only insofar as the states kept usual possession of the militia 
and could use their militia for state purposes when the militia was not 
in the service of the United States.103 But even during their training, 
states’ possession of the militia was subservient to national policy 
decisions.104 And contrary to Yassky’s argument, the sharp defeat of 
Madison’s general officer proposal was not because state governments 
predominate over the militia. Instead, the reservations to the states of 
appointing all officers and conducting the training were modest 
concessions to state power during a series of debates where the 
Convention considered whether to fully nationalize the militia. Because 
the Convention had already transferred most authority over the militia 
to the federal government, the delegates resisted Madison’s further 
attempt to chip away at what little state power remained. 
Perhaps reflecting the unusual, hybrid federal-state nature of 
the militia, the Framers and their contemporaries even inconsistently 
named the militia. Yassky correctly identifies both the Commander-in-
 
 98. David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 606–07 (2000). 
 99. Id. at 607. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 607 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 23, at 1496 (analogizing to property law by explaining that the 
Constitution had transferred “title” of the militia to the national government while allowing states 
to retain usual “possession” of the militia). 
 104. Samuel Huntington correctly noted that the militia is neither state nor federal, but 
shared between them. He criticized the arrangement since it entangles the militia “in the 
conflicting interests of the federal system.” HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 169. 
Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:48 PM 
2020] FEDERALISM AND THE MILITARY POWER 1007 
Chief Clause105 and the Militia Act of 1792106 as referring to “the militia 
of the several States.” But there are numerous examples of contrary 
usage referring to the militia as a national force. In Federalist No. 29, 
Hamilton argues against “disciplining all the militia of the United 
States.”107 The Militia Act of 1792 was entitled “An Act More Effectually 
to Provide for the National Defence, by establishing an Uniform Militia 
throughout the United States.” The Second Amendment also treats the 
militia singularly (“[a] well regulated Militia”), calling it “necessary to 
the security of a free State”—by which it means a free country, not a 
free Pennsylvania or New York.108 Prior to the 1792 Militia Act, George 
Washington submitted a proposal from Secretary of War Henry Knox 
concerning a “plan for the general arrangement of the militia of the 
United States.”109 Early Congresses routinely referred to the “militia of 
the United States.” For example, the Journal of the Senate reports a 
proposed bill entitled, “An act to regulate the pay of the non-
commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, of the militia of the 
United States, when called into actual service, and for other 
purposes.”110 The Third Congress also proposed to reorganize the militia 
by declaring that “the Militia of the United States shall be composed of 
all able-bodied white male citizens, of the respective States, resident 
therein, [between certain ages].”111 
Given the sui generis federalized nature of the militia, it is 
difficult to analogize to other governmental bodies. One helpful analogy, 
however, might be to a U.S. House delegation. All members of the House 
of Representatives are ipso facto members of their state’s House 
delegation. And a state’s House delegation, for some limited purposes, 
is treated as a distinct entity. For example, under the Twelfth 
Amendment, if no presidential candidate receives a majority of the 
Electoral College, then each state’s delegation receives one vote. But 
calling Nancy Pelosi solely a member of the California House 
Delegation states a half-truth. By being elected to the House of 
Representatives from California, Representative Pelosi simultaneously 
obtains membership in the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 106. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. 
 107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. II. On the phrase “a free state” meaning “a free polity”—not a state 
government free from federal interference—see Eugene Volokh, “Necessary to the Security of a Free 
State,” 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2007). 
 109. Message from President George Washington to the Senate (Jan. 21, 1790), in 1 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS ON MILITARY AFFAIRS 6, 6 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832). 
 110. S. JOURNAL, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1795). 
 111. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1214 (Joseph Gales ed., 1855) (1795). 
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California House Delegation. And, for most purposes, the California 
House Delegation consists of nothing more than a subset of the U.S. 
House of Representatives elected from California, even though, in 
limited cases, it exercises power as a distinct entity. Under the 
Constitution, the militia works the same way. All members of the 
militia of the United States are members of the militia of the state 
wherein they reside. For some limited purposes, each state’s militia is 
a separate legal entity: it has, for example, a separate officer corps and 
conducts its training separately from the other states. But in the 
enumerated emergencies in which Congress and the president may call 
forth the militia, each state’s militia is a constitutive part of the 
national military forces under the command of the president and 
subject to the government of Congress. A member of the militia of the 
United States who moves from New York and takes up residence in 
Pennsylvania, by that action alone, leaves the militia of New York and 
joins the militia of Pennsylvania. 
It may be that some of the confusion over the nature of the 
militia derives from how our use of the word “militia” has changed over 
time. In the Second Amendment context, Chief Justice Burger 
characterized the militia as “state armies,”112 a characterization often 
accepted by those who adopt the collective-rights view of that 
Amendment.113 Under this view, the “state militia” is the name that we 
give to the state analogue of the federal army, just as “governor” is the 
state executive analogue of the federal president. Using “militia” in this 
manner, states can have multiple militias: it might have a National 
Guard and a state defense force.114 
Although this language is in common use today, the Framers 
used the terms differently. When the Framers referred to “the militia” 
at the Convention, they were referring to the entire national able-
bodied population subject to military service. They sometimes referred 
to this as “the whole militia.”115 From the whole militia, there might be 
 
 112. Warren E. Burger, The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE MAG., Jan. 14, 1990, at 4, 4. 
 113. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 114. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 352 (1990) (stating that the federal law authorizing 
state defense forces permitted a state “to [have] a separate militia of its own” (citation omitted)). 
 115. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 331 (statement of John Dickinson); see also Debates of the 
Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), supra note 93, at 1312 (statement of George Mason) (“[W]ho 
are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers.”); A Letter from 
a Gentleman in a Neighbouring State (New York) to a Gentleman in this City, CONN. J., Oct. 31, 
1787, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
DIGITAL EDITION 380, 389 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) (“The militia comprehends all the 
male inhabitants from sixteen to sixty years of age . . . .”); Letter XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), in LETTERS 
FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN, reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, supra, at 360, 362 (ascribed to Richard 
Henry Lee) (“First, the constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select militia, 
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discrete organized units, a “select militia” in the Framers’ 
terminology.116 Thus, using the Framers’ terminology, the National 
Guard is a “select militia”—what today we call an “organized militia.” 
Indeed, the National Guard is only part of the organized militia of the 
state.117 A state’s “defense force” or “state guard” is arguably a second 
organized component.118 But the United States only has one general 
militia from which such forces are drawn. 
Thus, the Constitution carefully split power over the militia 
between the federal and state governments. During national 
emergencies, the militia comprised an essential part of the nation’s 
military forces. Outside of those emergencies, Congress set national 
militia policy, but Congress had to rely on the states to execute its plans, 
including for militia training. Also, states retained the power to select 
the officers, which meant the national military system had two chains 
of command—a professional chain beholden to federal leaders and a 
nonprofessional chain beholden to the states. At least in theory, the 
division of the militia offered enough centralization to remedy the 
deficiencies of the decentralized system under the Articles of 
Confederation. But the Constitution stopped short of vesting all of the 
country’s military power in Congress and the president during 
peacetime. 
C. Practical Implications of Shared Federal-State  
Control over the Militia 
The shared federal-state authority over the militia is not merely 
an academic observation. The federal character of the militia creates 
many difficult constitutional and legal issues. 
1. Is the Militia Part of the State or Federal Government? 
The classification of militia as “state” or “federal” matters for a 
variety of constitutional and statutory reasons. One issue is whether a 
militia officer possesses “any Office under the United States” for 
 
by providing that the militia shall always . . . include . . . all men capable of bearing arms; and that 
all regulations tending to render this general militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select 
corps of militia . . . [are] to be avoided.”). 
 116. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 331 (statement of George Mason) (proposing a 
select militia for the federal government). 
 117. 10 U.S.C. § 246 (2012); 32 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2012). The naval militia is statutorily part of 
the organized militia, too. 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1). But I dispute this characterization above. See 
supra note 56.  
 118. On the questionable status of state guards and state defenses forces as “militia,” see infra 
notes 437–445 and accompanying text. 
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purposes of the Ineligibility Clause.119 This first became an issue in 
1802, when President Thomas Jefferson appointed Representative John 
P. Van Ness of New York to be a major in the District of Columbia 
militia. The House Committee of Elections studied the issue and 
recommended that Representative Van Ness’s seat become vacant 
because he “accepted and exercised the office of Major of Militia, under 
the authority of the United States, within the Territory of Columbia, 
and [hath] thereby forfeited his right to a seat as a member of this 
House.”120 During the debates, Representative Van Ness inquired into 
whether all militia officers—including those of the territories or 
states—could not become members of Congress. He asked:  
If it be determined that the militia officers of this District shall be excluded, the same rule 
will apply to all militia officers appointed by the Governors of the Territories of the United 
States. Do you not also exclude the militia officers of the States, who, though appointed 
in the States, are subject to the command of the United States?121   
  Over Representative Van Ness’s objections, the House 
unanimously approved the recommendation.122 The vote was 
understood as setting a clear precedent that District militia officers 
held offices under the United States and could not simultaneously serve 
as members of Congress.123 Of course, Van Ness’s case was 
overdetermined: he was a militia officer in the District of Columbia, 
which is a federal enclave. Logically, Van Ness could be a federal officer, 
even if the militia officers in the states were not. As a result, the 
precedent of his case is limited. 
 Congress studied the issue again in 1916, after the creation of 
the National Guard system—but before National Guard officers were 
required to simultaneously join the U.S. Army Reserve.124 The House 
Judiciary Committee, after examining the extensive federal control 
over the National Guard, concluded that National Guard officers held 
offices under the United States.125 The full House never acted on the 
report. Obviously, classifying the militia as “state” or “federal” is 
relevant to determining whether militia officers appointed by the states 
are federal officers for purposes of the Incompatibility Clause. 
 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. My thanks to Will Baude for pointing out this issue. 
 120. H.R. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 290 (1803). 
 121. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 397 (Joseph Gales ed., 1851) (1803). 
 122. Id. at 398. 
 123. Id. at 398–99 (statement of John Randolph) (calling this “a precedent so important as was 
about to be established by the vote of the House”). 
 124. On dual enlistment, see infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text. 
 125. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RIGHT OF A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS TO HOLD 
COMMISSION IN NATIONAL GUARD, H.R. REP. NO. 64-885, at 3 (1916). 
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Besides its constitutional significance, the characterization of 
militia as “federal” or “state” is relevant to federal statutory law. For 
example, in In re Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit decided that the Vermont Army National Guard 
could violate the federal Privacy Act by releasing private information 
even when the National Guard was not in active federal service.126 Since 
the Act does not apply to private data releases by state officers, the 
classification of the militia as federal or state matters. And for purposes 
of federal jurisdiction over military offenses, nineteenth century court 
decisions held that the militia did not become employed by the United 
States “until their arrival at the place of rendezvous and muster.”127  
On the issue of whether militiamen are part of the state or 
federal government, I do not offer a firm answer. For militia officers, 
the Constitution vests the power to appoint (and presumably the power 
to remove) in state governments, which gives strong reason to classify 
them as state officers. But militiamen are, as Representative Van Ness 
noted, subject to the command and control of the U.S. government 
whether in active service or carrying out Congress’s commands 
regarding the militia’s organization, arming, and discipline. Thus, 
because of the federal character of the militia, the federal or state status 
of militiamen is a close and difficult question. Ultimately, the answer 
may depend on the context in which the issue is raised.128 
2. May States Refuse to Send Militia Forces? 
A dispute over whether states may withhold their militia forces 
arose during the War of 1812, when Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island refused to place their militias under the command of army 
officers assigned unified geographic commands. An opinion from the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court backed these states.129 The 
court held that the two chains of command were completely separate: 
 
 126. In re Sealed Case, 551 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2009). While serving on the D.C. Circuit, then-
Judge Kavanaugh correctly argued in his concurrence that this case might also be overdetermined 
since Vermont National Guard members were also members of the “National Guard of the United 
States,” which makes them members of a federal reserve force. Id. at 1054–55 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring). 
 127. 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 95 (2nd ed. 1920) (collecting 
authorities). 
 128. For example, it is possible that militia officers can be treated statutorily as federal 
employees even if they are constitutionally state officers. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 564 (2012) (holding that a penalty for failure to purchase health insurance may 
constitute a “tax” under the Constitution, while not being a statutory “tax” for purposes of the 
Anti-Injunction Act).  
 129. See Op. of the Justices, 8 Mass. (8 Tyng) 548 (1812) (opining that the governor of the 
commonwealth has the exclusive authority to command the militia). 
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no officer of the army had a right to command the militia, and no officer 
of the militia had a right to command the army. While Congress could 
govern the militia when in the actual service of the United States, the 
Massachusetts court opined, “[T]o extend this power to the placing of 
them under the command of an officer, not of the militia, except the 
president, would render nugatory the provision, that the militia are to 
have officers appointed by the states.”130 The court rejected the concept 
that the army and militia could form a unified force under the command 
of the national government in national emergencies.131 
The federal government united in its opposition to 
Massachusetts’s position. Although no legislation or formal judicial 
opinion ensued on this subject, members of all three branches issued 
strong rebukes. 
James Monroe, then the Secretary of War, sent the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee a long and detailed letter laying out his 
view of the relationship between the militia and the army, challenging 
the Massachusetts court opinion specifically. Monroe noted that the 
Constitution charges Congress—not the states—with determining 
when to call forth the militia to meet the constitutionally enumerated 
emergencies.132 Requiring the federal government, first, to get approval 
of Congress to call forth the militia, and second, to negotiate with state 
governments individually, would make the militia practically 
useless.133 And Monroe’s position is on strong ground: one of the 
motivating factors prompting the Constitutional Convention to increase 
federal power over the militia was the refusal of state governments to 
supply adequate forces to enforce national laws and suppress 
insurrections. If the Massachusetts court were correct, Congress’s 
power over the militia in emergencies would be virtually returned to 
the disastrous position it held under the Articles of Confederation. 
Further, the constitutional text confirms Monroe’s view: the only time 
in which state governments must be consulted before militia are called 
forth are cases of domestic violence within a state.134 Given the 
unworkability of having separate chains of command during wartime, 
Monroe noted that the only reasonable response would be for the federal 
government to maintain a large standing army, which few at the 
Convention preferred. In Monroe’s view, the Constitution was meant to 
allow the country to provide for a true national defense. When the 
 
 130. Id. at 550. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Letter from James Monroe, Sec’y of War, to Senate Military Affairs Comm. (Feb. 11, 
1815), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 109, at 604, 605. 
 133. Id. at 605–06. 
 134. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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federal government gains control over the militia during the 
constitutionally enumerated emergencies, states no longer have any 
authority over it.135 Like the army, the militia, when in federal service, 
is paid and governed by the national government and is subject to the 
command of the president. The army and militia are not merely allied 
forces. Rather, consistent with the Constitution’s purpose to “provide 
for the common defense,”136 the army and militia constitute “one 
national force”—a combined force of regulars and irregulars.137 
The Senate Military Affairs Committee warmly received 
Monroe’s position. While “refrain[ing] from entering into arguments to 
fortify the grounds taken by the Executive Government on this subject,” 
the Committee nevertheless “express[ed] a decided approbation of its 
conduct.”138 The Committee found no authority within the Constitution 
to support the states’ position, which, to quote Monroe, “pushe[d] the 
doctrine of State rights further than I have ever known it to be carried 
in any other instance.”139 
Finally, from the judicial branch, Justice Story recorded his 
opposition. Justice Story dimly noted that if the Massachusetts court’s 
argument were sustained, “the public service must be continually liable 
to very great embarrassments in all cases, where the militia are called 
into the public service in connexion with the regular troops.”140 
As an originalist matter, Monroe’s position on militia officers 
and command is correct. The Constitution, while reserving some 
authority over the militia to state governments, provided Congress and 
the president with supreme power over national defense. At the 
Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison explained the importance of 
preventing states from obstructing the federal government’s calling 
forth of necessary military forces in times of emergency.141 
Constitutionally, the militia serves two masters and bridges the 
federal-state divide. Even when the militia is under state authority, 
militiamen directly execute some federal commands. For instance, the 
militia is organized pursuant to federal law, and the militia must train 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. When called into 
actual service, the militia is part of the national military leadership 
 
 135. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 34–35 (1820). 
 136. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 137. Letter from James Monroe, Sec’y of War, to Senate Military Affairs Comm., supra note 
132, at 606. 
 138. Id. at 604. 
 139. Id. at 606. 
 140. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1210 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
 141. Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1272, 1274 
(statement of James Madison); see also infra note 423 (collecting authorities on the veto issue). 
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under the ultimate command of the president. When they are not in 
federal service, however, the militia reports to its respective states.   
3. May States Deprive Their Citizens of the Right to  
Keep and Bear Arms? 
The dual nature of the militia also matters for purposes of 
federal preemption of state gun control laws. Even absent the 
incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states, state 
governments cannot interfere with the federal power to call forth the 
militia, as the Supreme Court explained in Presser v. Illinois.142 In that 
case, the Supreme Court affirmed convictions for parading in a city with 
arms and organizing as a private military company. Presser claimed, 
on appeal, that those laws violated the right to keep and bear arms and 
federal militia law. The Court, in explaining the limits of its decision, 
held that its decision only applied to two narrow sections of Illinois law 
that prohibited parading as a group with arms and associating as 
private military companies. Although, in this pre-incorporation 
decision,143 the Court held that the Second Amendment did not apply to 
the states, the Court noted: 
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved 
military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in view 
of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States 
cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question [i.e., the Second Amendment] 
out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United 
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people 
from performing their duty to the general government.144 
In other words, even if the Second Amendment had not been 
incorporated, the states would still lack authority to deprive citizens of 
their arms. Whatever concurrent authority the states possess to 
regulate the militia of that state, the states cannot exercise that 
authority in a way that impairs the ability of the national government 
to call forth the militia. A state law that broadly deprived citizens of 
their arms would do just that: impair the militia by making it 
impossible for citizens to train or to muster for military service at the 
call of the federal government during national emergencies. 
 
 142. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 143. McDonald v. City of Chicago subsequently applied the Second Amendment to the states. 
561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 144. Presser, 116 U.S. at 265. 
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D. Military Checks and Balances 
In providing for a robust series of military checks and balances, 
the Framers paid excruciating detail to the possible combinations of 
private and state-sponsored violence. The Framers provided for 
protection against private mobs, insurrections against state or federal 
governments, foreign invasions, state oppression, violence between 
state governments, and federal oppression.145 
Part of these reciprocal checks comprised duties of the federal 
government to the states and their inhabitants. To protect against 
abuses by state governments, the federal government had the duty to 
“guarantee . . . a Republican Form of Government” and to protect each 
state against “Invasion,” by which the Framers meant not just 
invasions by foreign powers, but also invasions by other states.146 The 
Constitution also gave the federal government the direct power to call 
forth the militia to enforce federal law, suppress insurrections, and 
repel foreign invasions without the need to work through state 
governments.147 
In addition to carefully guarding against abuse by state 
governments and lawless mobs, the Framers were concerned about 
oppression by federal officials. To prevent the president’s use of the 
armed forces for oppression, the Framers provided some horizontal 
checks on executive power. While the president is commander in chief, 
only Congress can raise an army, provide or maintain a navy, declare 
war, regulate the armed forces, or provide for calling out the militia.148 
This horizontal division of power has been the subject of lengthy 
scholarly discussion, and I will not delve further into this topic until 
Part IV.149 
 
 145. On the checks being reciprocal, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 24, 
at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Power being almost always the rival of power, the general 
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and 
these will have the same disposition towards the general government.”). 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), 
supra note 93, at 1311–12 (statement of James Madison) (“The word invasion here, after power 
had been given in the former clause to repel invasions, may be thought tautologous, but it has a 
different meaning from the other. This clause speaks of a particular State. It means that it shall 
be protected from invasion by other States.”). In the Federalist Papers, Madison says that the 
Article IV guarantee applies to both foreign invasions and to invasions by other states. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 24, at 275–76 (James Madison) (“The latitude of the expression 
here used seems to secure each State not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or 
vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors.”). 
 147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 148. HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 168–69. 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 177–84, 400–27; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional 
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (presenting a framework 
for interpreting the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force); Jonathan Turley, The 
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But the Constitution also provided vertical checks on military 
power.150 The militia—the bulk of the people capable of bearing arms—
were to be led by officers appointed by the states, not the federal 
government. The states, not the federal government, were to train and 
govern the militia, except when in the actual service of the United 
States (though the states had the obligation to follow Congress’s policy 
judgments on these matters). And after the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights, Congress lost any power to deprive citizens of their right to keep 
and bear arms.151   
Thus, while the armies and navy of the United States remained 
exclusively in national control, control over the militia was divided 
between the national and state governments. The federal government 
could use the militia to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, and 
repel invasions. In preparation for national defense, it could provide for 
the militia’s organization, arming, and disciplining, and it could govern 
the militia when it was called to federal service. Beyond setting national 
defense policy and having access to the full military power in times of 
emergency, the federal government did not govern the bulk of citizens 
capable of bearing arms. The militia, thus separated from the 
professional services and with a distinct officer staff not beholden to 
federal officials, could serve as a check on the illegal use of federal 
military power.152 
 
*        *        * 
 
To ensure an adequate check on federal power by the state 
governments, the Framers placed several safeguards in the 
Constitution. They separated the “Armies” and the “Militia,” and placed 
limitations on the federal government’s power over the militia. Among 
these limitations, they required the federal and state governments to 
share control over the militia, and they insulated the militia officer 
corps from direct federal supervision in peacetime. Today, all of these 
checks have been dismantled. 
 
Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 40–47 (2002) (describing textualist and 
intentionalist rationales for a distinct military government); John C. Yoo, War and the 
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002) (articulating a flexible approach to presidential 
war powers). 
 150. HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 168–69. 
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 152. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299 (James Madison) (“[T]he existence of 
subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which the militia officers are 
appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any 
which a simple government of any form can admit of.”). 
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II. EXPANDING FEDERAL MILITARY POWER BY COLLAPSING THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA 
The first way in which the federal government has gained 
control over the militia is by collapsing the organized militia into the 
national army through the National Guard system. In this Part, I will 
make two claims. First, dual enlistment is unconstitutional because the 
army reserve is unconstitutional. The U.S. Army Reserve is an 
organized militia—not an army—and is therefore subject to the Militia 
Clauses. Second, the present system of dual enlistment of militia 
officers violates the constitutional requirement that the states appoint 
militia officers. Before delving into these arguments, however, I will 
briefly lay out the present militia system. 
A. The National Guard: Part Militia and  
Part U.S. Army Reserve 
Congress has passed two major militia acts. The first such act 
was the Militia Act of 1792, which required all free able-bodied white 
male citizens between eighteen and forty-five years of age to enroll in 
the militia.153 That law required militiamen to obtain certain weapons 
and authorized the president to call forth the militia for its 
constitutional purposes. Congress reenacted the law in 1795 with slight 
changes.154 Congress bolstered the president’s original authority with 
the Insurrection Act of 1807,155 the Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 
1861,156 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,157 which gave the president 
the authority to use either the militia or the armed forces to enforce 
federal authority and to prevent interference with state or federal law. 
Versions of these laws remain as federal law today.158 
Although early Congresses attempted to provide for a universal 
militia system, the militia performed badly in the War of 1812, and any 
attempt to maintain a universal militia mostly died thereafter.159 The 
 
 153. The Militia Act of 1792 comprises two separate laws. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 
Stat. 271 (organizing the militia) (repealed 1903); Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 
1795) (giving the president authority to call forth the militia). 
 154. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424. Among the changes was eliminating the 
requirement that a judicial officer certify the need to call out the militia before the president could 
use the militia to enforce the laws. 
 155. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443. 
 156. Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281. 
 157. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3–4, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15. 
 158. The current versions of these laws can be found in Title 10, Chapter 13 of the United 
States Code. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255 (2012) (effective Dec. 23, 2016). 
 159. Frederick Bernays Wiener, Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 188–
93 (1940). 
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militia played a minor role in the Mexican War, although militia units 
were a source of federal volunteers for the expanded wartime army.160 
During the Civil War, the federal government began relying on federal 
conscripts into the regular army in addition to the militia.161 Congress 
also expanded enrollment in the militia beyond white citizens.162 
Following the Civil War, however, the militia “virtually ceased to exist” 
and was replaced with volunteer militia units known as the National 
Guard.163 Despite the emergence of the National Guard, the 1792 
Militia Act, as amended, remained on the books through the rest of the 
nineteenth century, long after the Act was obsolete.164 
In 1903, Congress overhauled the militia system with the Dick 
Act.165 That Act declared that all able-bodied male citizens (and 
residents who intended to become citizens) between the ages of eighteen 
and forty-five were members of the militia, and it divided the militia 
into a volunteer, organized component—the National Guard—and a 
reserve militia. This framework is substantially the same as today’s 
militia law.166 The Dick Act also imposed regular training requirements 
on the National Guard and prescribed qualifications for its officers and 
enlisted personnel. The Act made federal funds and regular army 
officers available to help organize and train the militia. 
While the Dick Act attempted to modernize the militia, the law 
did not solve another irritant of early twentieth-century federal 
policymakers: the unavailability of the militia for overseas duty. The 
United States maintained only a small standing army, inadequate for 
its expeditionary campaigns in Cuba, the Philippines, and other foreign 
places. The Militia Clauses only provided for a defensive force, not a tool 
to project power around the globe.167 
 
 160. JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 91 (1983); see JERRY 
COOPER, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD: THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN MILITIA, 1865–
1920, at 18–19 (1997). 
 161. See COOPER, supra note 160, at 20–21. 
 162. Militia Act of 1862, ch. 201, sec. 1, 12 Stat. 597. 
 163. Wiener, supra note 159, at 191; see also JAMES T. CURRIE & RICHARD B. CROSSLAND, 
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE, 1908–1995, at 8 (2d ed. 
1997) (noting that, by the Mexican War, “few states retained an effective militia system”). The 
emergence of the National Guard partly had to do with states using the militia to control labor 
unrest. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra, at 9. 
 164. See COOPER, supra note 160, at 109. 
 165. Militia Act of 1903 (Dick Act), ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775. 
 166. See 10 U.S.C. § 246 (2012). 
 167. In 1908, Congress authorized the organized militia to serve “either within or without the 
territory of the United States.” Militia Act of 1908, ch. 204, § 4, 35 Stat. 399, 400. But the Attorney 
General concluded that the militia could not be used outside the United States except when the 
Constitution otherwise authorized the federal government to call forth the militia (e.g., repelling 
invasions). As a result, the president could not use the organized militia as an occupying army. 
Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322 (1912). 
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Congress attempted to escape the constitutional limitations on 
federal use of the militia with the National Defense Act of 1916.168 This 
law contained a forerunner to modern dual enlistment. Section 111 of 
the Act authorized the president to draft members of the National 
Guard into the army in times of war.169 Once drafted, individual Guard 
members lost their status as militiamen and became federal soldiers 
until discharged. 
This system of drafting Guard members created several 
problems. First, the draft operated on Guardsmen as individuals, not 
as units. Consequently, Guard units lost much of their cohesion as their 
members dispersed into the army. Moreover, when the Guard members 
were discharged from the army, the National Defense Act did not 
automatically revert them back to being members of the National 
Guard.170 
Congress remedied these issues with the National Defense Act 
of 1933.171 That Act required the dual-enlistment system that the 
National Guard uses today. All officers and enlisted personnel of the 
National Guard simultaneously enroll in two organizations. First, they 
enroll in the “National Guard of [a state],” which is the organized militia 
of that state.172 Second, they enroll in the “National Guard of the United 
States,” which is part of the U.S. Army Reserve.173 The “National Guard 
[of all the states]” and the “National Guard of the United States,” 
therefore, have coextensive memberships.174 Moreover, unlike the 1916 
Act, the federal government can federalize entire National Guard units 
rather than merely drafting the Guard’s membership as individuals. 
This results in the National Guard having a “dual federal-state status 
[that] has been described as ‘murky and mystical.’ ”175 
 
 168. National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, 39 Stat. 166. 
 169. Id. § 111, 39 Stat. at 211. 
 170. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990). 
 171. National Defense Act Amendments of 1933, ch. 87, §§ 5–6, 11, 48 Stat. 153, 155–58. 
 172. See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 173. See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 174. In its brief in Perpich, the Government contended that the membership of the National 
Guard and the National Guard of the United States may not be perfectly coextensive. Brief for the 
Respondents at 4 n.3, Perpich, 496 U.S. 334 (No. 89-542), 1990 WL 505675 (asserting that “because 
no statute requires that all members of the National Guard be members of the [National Guard of 
the United States] as well, there may be rare instances in which an individual’s membership in 
the [National Guard of the United States] is terminated, while his membership in the state 
National Guard is not”). But federal law presently requires the discharge of National Guard 
members whose federal recognition is withdrawn. See 32 U.S.C. § 322(a)(2) (2012) (enlisted 
members); 32 U.S.C. § 324(a)(2) (2012) (officers). 
 175. In re Sealed Case, 551 F.3d 1047, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. United States, 
49 Fed. Cl. 673, 676 (2001)). 
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The creation of the “National Guard of the United States” as a 
component of the U.S. Army Reserve has allowed Congress to use the 
personnel and equipment of the organized militia for purposes beyond 
those enumerated in the Constitution’s Militia Clauses. For example, 
the militia cannot serve in Iraq or Afghanistan; such forces are not 
enforcing the laws, suppressing insurrections, or repelling invasions—
the only purposes for which the Constitution allows the federal 
government to use the militia.176 To avoid this constitutional problem, 
Congress simply changes the militia’s “hat.”177 Thus, when National 
Guard units fight in Iraq or Afghanistan, they fight as members of the 
“National Guard of the United States”—that is, in their capacity as 
members of the army reserve. When performing state militia duties, 
they operate as members of the “National Guard of [their state].” 
The Supreme Court effectively upheld this scheme in Perpich v. 
Department of Defense. In Perpich, President Reagan ordered the 
National Guard to train in Central America, but the governor of 
Minnesota objected to having the National Guard train abroad.178 These 
“training missions” had become divisive: governors alleged that the 
President was using the “training missions” to undermine the 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.179 The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 
1952 required a declaration of a national emergency or a governor’s 
consent before sending the National Guard abroad for training.180 When 
governors began objecting to the Central American mission, Congress 
passed the Montgomery Amendment, which partially repealed the 
ability of governors to withhold their consent.181 
Perpich upheld the validity of the Montgomery Amendment. 
Assuming the validity of dual enlistment,182 the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the Guard members were sent for training as 
soldiers of the “National Guard of the United States,” not as militiamen 
in the National Guard of Minnesota.183 
 
 176. See Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322 
(1912). 
 177. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 348. 
 178. Id. at 336–38. 
 179. See Carl T. Bogus, What Does the Second Amendment Restrict? A Collective Rights 
Analysis, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 503 (2001) (“[T]he federal government ordered more than 
12,000 National Guardsmen for active duty training in Central America . . . . President Reagan 
wanted to use these exercises to intimidate the Sandinista government in Nicaragua with a show 
of force and to assist in developing a staging area for a Contra-rebel invasion of Nicaragua.”); see 
also Monte M.F. Cooper, Notes and Comments, Perpich v. Department of Defense: Federalism 
Values and the Militia Clause, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 637, 644–45 (1991). 
 180. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 336–37. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 347. 
 183. Id. at 349–50. 
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Although the Supreme Court assumed the validity of dual 
enlistment (because Minnesota did not challenge it), the dual-
enlistment system has two constitutional infirmities. First, the U.S. 
Army Reserve is an organized “militia,” not an “army,” and this 
federally organized militia does not conform to the requirements of the 
Militia Clauses. Second, dual enlistment, as applied to militia officers, 
violates the requirement that state governments appoint militia 
officers. 
B. Unconstitutionality of the U.S. Army Reserve 
The U.S. Army did not maintain a part-time citizen-soldier 
reserve force until the twentieth century. The army reserve was 
originally created in 1908 to provide medical officers to the army in 
times of emergency.184 The 1912 Army Appropriations Act expanded the 
reserves by lengthening regular army enlistment contracts and having 
regular soldiers serve three or four years in a reserve status.185 
Significant organization of the reserves came in 1916 when Congress 
expanded the reserves to have a “Regular Army Reserve” and created 
the Reserve Officers Training Corps to supply temporary officers in 
wartime.186 Following World War I, Congress passed the National 
Defense Act of 1920, which overhauled the federal army’s structure. 
The army gained a permanent combat reserve corps of officers and 
enlisted personnel, and the Act continued the president’s authority to 
draft National Guard soldiers.187 
The U.S. Army Reserve has several components, including the 
Ready Reserve (which itself is broken down into the Selected Reserve,  
the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive National Guard), the 
 
 184. Act of Apr. 23, 1908, ch. 150, 35 Stat. 66; CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 17. 
 185. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 23. 
 186. National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, §§ 30–55, 39 Stat. 166, 187–97. 
 187. National Defense Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759. The creation of the U.S. 
Army Reserve had no analogue in historical British military practice. As in the United States, the 
creation of the British Army Reserve is fairly recent. In 1859, following problems with the Army 
during the Crimean War, the first volunteer reserve units formed (“the Volunteer Force”); 
Parliament legislated on the subject with the Army of Reserve Act in 1867, which authorized the 
creation of reserve forces from the militia and from regular soldiers about to end their enlistment 
contracts. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 296–98. This haphazard militia/reserve system ended with 
the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907, which disbanded the historical British militia. 
Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907, 7 Edw. 7 c. 9. The Act incorporated the militia—along 
with the Volunteer Force and the Yeomanry (which originated as volunteer cavalry regiments)—
into the “Territorial Forces,” which became a reserve component of the standing British Army. 
Thus, until fairly recently, there was no history of reserve forces outside of the militia system in 
Britain. 
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Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.188 The Selected Reserve 
portion of the Ready Reserve is the active, drilling reserve (“one 
weekend a month, two weeks a year”).189 Active members of the 
“National Guard of the United States” are members of the Selected 
Reserve.190 The other reserves are a list of names subject to service upon 
being mobilized, but not otherwise in an active drilling capacity. My 
argument here will focus on the active, drilling reserve—the Selected 
Reserve. The National Guard dual-enlistment system is 
unconstitutional because the federal government has no constitutional 
authorization to keep an active, drilling army reserve. 
The Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o raise and 
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for 
a longer Term than two Years.”191 The Framers rejected every attempt 
to textually limit the Army Clause, except for requiring appropriations 
not to extend past two years.192 Given this history, the constitutionality 
of the army reserve may seem like an easy case. Why does it matter how 
much service the federal government requires of its armies? With no 
textual limits on the Army Clause, the federal government can seek 
enlistments of one, two, or ten years. Why can it not require forty 
weekends of service during those one, two, or ten years instead of full-
time service? 
My answer to this challenge is that although the federal 
government has plenary authority over its “Armies,” this begs the 
question. The force at issue still must be part of the “Armies,” as that 
term is understood by the Constitution. The army reserve is not. 
Instead, the army reserve is an organized part of the constitutional 
militia and should therefore be subject to the Militia Clauses. 
In several places, the Constitution differentiates between 
“Armies” and “Militia.”193 Congress has the power to “raise and support 
Armies.”194 It may “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land . . . Forces.”195 The ordinary rules of criminal procedure do not 
 
 188. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 10141–10154 (2012) (providing for and defining these categories 
and their subcategories). 
 189. 10 U.S.C. § 10143 (2012). 
 190. Id. 
 191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 192. See supra notes 37, 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 193. See S.T. Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471, 476–77 
(1917) (explaining the historical distinction between the two entities). This is not a comprehensive 
list of every constitutional provision. In addition, the Constitution makes the president 
commander in chief of the army and commander in chief of the militia—but for the latter, only 
“when called into actual Service of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 195. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
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apply to “cases arising in the land . . . forces.”196 And States are 
prohibited from “keep[ing] Troops . . . in time of peace.”197 In contrast, 
the federal and state governments share control over the militia.198 And 
unlike the land forces, the militia is not subject to military law except 
“when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”199 So what 
distinguishes “Armies,” “Troops,” and “land forces” from the “Militia”? 
“Armies” referred to regular troops, which means that 
Congress’s power to “raise and support Armies” could have equivalently 
said that Congress has the power to “raise and support regular troops.” 
“Militia,” in contrast, referred to the entire able-bodied populace that, 
by law, was callable to military service in emergencies and, outside of 
those emergencies, was subject (or could be made subject) to periodic 
military training. United States v. Miller correctly summarizes this: 
The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with 
Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment 
of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate 
defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia—civilians primarily, 
soldiers on occasion. 
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the 
Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of 
approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males 
physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. “A body of citizens enrolled 
for military discipline.”200 
Framing-era sources confirm this usage. In a long passage, 
Adam Smith lays this out most clearly in Wealth of Nations, in which 
he differentiates “militia” from “armies”: 
In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the State can make 
any tolerable provision for the public defence. 
It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the whole bent of 
the interest, genius and inclinations of the people, enforce the practice of military 
exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of 
 
 196. Id. amend. V. 
 197. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 198. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16. 
 199. Id. amend. V. 
 200. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939); see also Burroughs v. Peyton, 57 Va. 
470, 475 (1864) (decided under the Confederate Constitution): 
An army is a body of men whose business is war: the militia a body of men composed of 
citizens occupied ordinarily in the pursuits of civil life, but organized for discipline and 
drill, and called into the field for temporary military service when the exigencies of the 
country require it;  
Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 22 (1996) 
(drawing similar conclusions from the textual evidence); Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, 
The Second Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 
1747 (1995) (same). 
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them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession 
they may happen to carry on. 
Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the constant 
practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, 
separate and distinct from all others. 
If the State has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military force is said to 
consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist in a standing army. The practice 
of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, 
and the maintenance or pay which the State affords them is the principal and ordinary 
fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the occasional 
occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary fund of 
their subsistence from some other occupation. In a militia, the character of the laborer, 
artificer, or tradesman predominates over that of the soldier: in a standing army, that of 
the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this distinction seems to 
consist the essential difference between those two different species of military force.201 
Thus, we see two categories of land forces emerge. There are 
“armies,” which consist of full-time soldiers. And there are “militia,” 
which consist of citizens with civilian occupations who are subject to 
occasional military exercises. There is no third category of “armies 
subject only to occasional military exercises”—which is what the army 
reserve purports to be. Just as “bachelors” are “unmarried men,” a 
“part-time army” is a “militia” by definition. 
Framing-era commentary demonstrates that this usage of 
“army” versus “militia” was widespread, if not universal.202 The debates 
at the Constitutional Convention consistently used the terms “army” 
and “armies” to refer to regular, professional forces.203 So did the 
Federalist Papers. For example, in speaking of how to man peacetime 
garrisons, Hamilton stated that they “must either be furnished by 
occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the 
pay of the government . . . [which] amounts to a standing army.”204 
Other Federalist Papers presupposed that armies constituted regular 
troops, distinguishing them from the militia, a part-time military 
force.205 
 
 201. 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 53–54. Part of this quotation is cited with approval in Miller. 
See 307 U.S. at 179. 
 202. “Troops” was used more haphazardly during the Framing. The immediate text following 
Adam Smith’s quotation above, for example, speaks of militia being organized into a “particular 
body of troops.” 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 55. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 28, however, uses 
“troops” to refer to more permanent forces than “militia.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 24, 
at 178–79 (Alexander Hamilton). The Constitution seems to equate “troops” with “regular 
soldiers.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 203. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 329 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (using “troops” 
to describe those manning the army); id. at 617 (statement of Gouverneur Morris) (stating that 
armies comprise the “military class of citizens”). 
 204. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 205. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 9, 16 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 20 (James Madison) 
(discussing the British Army); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the 
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The Antifederalist Papers were even more explicit. Richard 
Henry Lee wrote, “The military forces of a free country may be 
considered under three general descriptions—1. The militia. 2. the 
navy—and 3. the regular troops.”206 Lee explained that “[a] militia, 
when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render 
regular troops in a great measure unnecessary.”207 Consistent with the 
usage of Adam Smith and Alexander Hamilton, Lee drew a sharp 
distinction between “militia” and “regular troops.” 
Contemporary newspaper accounts also used the term “regular 
troops” to describe those who man an “army.” In discussing why “the 
army cannot be employed against [the country’s] liberties,” the 
Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer wrote, “[R]egular troops, who are 
natives of a country . . . bred in the principles of republican 
liberty . . . cannot be so generally corrupted . . . .”208 Other examples 
abound of writers either directly asserting—or clearly assuming—that 
armies comprise regular troops.209 
Similarly, other sources maintained the uniform distinction 
between regular troops and militia. Thomas Jefferson, writing to James 
Madison on the subject of including a Bill of Rights, wrote, “All facts put 
in issue before any judicature shall be tried by jury except . . . in cases 
cognizable before a court martial concerning only the regular officers & 
souldiers of the U. S. or members of the militia in actual service in time 
of war or insurrection . . . .”210 Early congressional debates 
distinguished the terms this way. In a debate over the Militia Act of 
1792, Representative John Page stated, “Soldiers, not a militia, must 
be the proper tools for the Government that wishes to enforce its laws 
by arms.”211 
Chief Justice Taney’s unpublished Civil War opinion on 
conscription also made the point when it stated, “The General 
 
power to raise armies under the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation); THE FEDERALIST 
NOS. 24, 25 (Alexander Hamilton) (assuming “army” referred to a “regular and disciplined army”); 
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 26, 29 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 41, 46 (James Madison) (making similar 
assumptions). 
 206. Letter XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), supra note 115, at 362 (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee).  
 207. Id. 
 208. Nicholas Collin, A Foreign Spectator, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER (Sept. 21, 1787), reprinted 
in COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 
1787-1788, at 44, 50–51 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998). 
 209. See, e.g., Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government (Oct. 21, 1787), 
in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 
431, 435–36; Cincinnatus IV: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y.J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, supra note 
115, at 186–87. 
 210. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 29, 1789), in THE ORIGIN OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 709, 709. 
 211. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 576 (Joseph Gales ed., 1855) (1789). 
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government has no militia, it has only the Army and Navy—The militia 
force . . . belongs to the several States and may be called on in the 
emergencies mentioned to aid the land and naval forces of the United 
States.”212 Members of the army are “a body of men separated from the 
general mass of citizen—subject to a different code of laws liable to be 
tried by Military Courts.”213 
One cannot argue that the Framers and their contemporaries 
had no concept of a part-time voluntary soldier. They did, and the 
Antifederalists feared them as much as a standing army. Richard 
Henry Lee continued: 
[T]he constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select militia, by 
providing that the militia . . . include, according to the past and general usuage of the 
states, all men capable of bearing arms; and that all regulations tending to render this 
general militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select corps of militia, or distinct 
bodies of military men, not having permanent interests and attachments in the 
community to be avoided.214    
In fact, creating something akin to the U.S. Army Reserve was 
discussed—and rejected—during the Constitutional Convention. In the 
negotiations over which government would control the militia, George 
Mason proposed “the idea of a select militia [under exclusive federal 
authority]. He was led to think that would be in fact as much as the 
Genl. Govt could advantageously be charged with.”215 Charles Pinckney 
and John Langdon thought the plan had some merit; both believed that 
the distrust of the federal government was unjustified and that 
difficulties would arise from splitting authority over the militia between 
the federal and state governments.216 Oliver Ellsworth, Roger Sherman, 
and Elbridge Gerry opposed it. Ellsworth thought the plan “would be 
followed by a ruinous declension of the great body of the Militia.”217 
Sherman argued that the states needed organized military forces 
because they might have to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, or 
enforce their laws.218 And Gerry asserted that the proposal gave too 
much power to the federal government.219 Mason’s plan drew both 
 
 212. Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United States, in THE MILITARY 
DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 209, 212 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982). 
 213. Id. at 211. 
 214. Letter XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), supra note 115, at 362 (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee); see 
also Lund, supra note 200, at 22 (stating that the “select militia” was “generally considered [a] 
perversion[ ] of the true militia”). 
 215. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 331. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 332. Ellsworth was right: the existence of the army reserve has placed much less 
emphasis on the federal government’s need to provide for the militia. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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support and resistance.220 Ultimately, Mason’s proposal was sent to the 
Grand Committee, where it died in favor of the current Militia 
Clauses.221 But had the Army Clause encompassed the power to raise 
part-time soldiers, the response to Mason’s proposed federal select 
militia would have been that Congress already possessed the power to 
raise part-time soldiers under the Army Clause.222 
If the term “army” could apply to part-time citizen-soldiers, 
many of the Framers’ arguments about the federal balance of military 
power would not make any sense. In Federalist No. 46, Madison, 
responding to concerns about the army becoming a vehicle of 
oppression, writes: 
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be 
entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it would not be going too far to say 
that the State governments with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger. 
The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be 
carried in any country does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; 
or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms.223 
Madison’s structural assumptions would be erroneous if the federal 
government had the power to create an army reserve. First, the federal 
government would have a rapid way of expanding the regular army 
without undergoing the significant expense of maintaining it at all 
times. This cuts against Madison’s assumption that the expense of a 
standing army would be a safeguard against the federal government 
maintaining a large one—an assumption Hamilton shared.224 
Second, numerous writings assumed that a well-regulated 
militia would render a standing army unnecessary.225 But had 
eighteenth-century Americans contemplated a reserve force, apart from 
the militia, this also would have rendered a large proportion of 
permanent troops unnecessary. Such a force would not have had the 
expense of a full standing army, but it likely would be better disciplined 
than the militia generally. 
Third, the Framers intended the militia to have the power to 
check the army. But if the federal government had the power to create 
military reserves, the federal government could fracture the militia as 
a counterbalancing force. The federal government would have (1) the 
regular army on its side and (2) a potentially large body of part-time 
 
 220. Id. at 332–33. 
 221. Id. at 333. 
 222. For Mason’s proposal, see supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 24, at 299. 
 224. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 24, at 178–79. 
 225. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 388 (statement of James Madison); Coxe, supra 
note 209, at 435. 
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citizen-soldiers that report directly to it, rather than to state officers. 
The militia would comprise the remainder. Such an arrangement would 
have run contrary to the understanding of the Framers. As Noah 
Webster said, “The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust 
laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and 
constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on 
any pretence, raised in the United States.”226 Recognizing the power to 
create an army reserve destroys the check that the militia was supposed 
to provide against the standing army. 
Ironically, a federal power to create a military reserve might 
have allayed some of the contemporary fears over standing armies.227 
Contemporary sentiment feared standing armies largely because 
armies comprised a class of military citizens, under military law, 
separate from the population generally. To quote Tench Coxe, being a 
soldier “is a profession that is liable to dangerous perversion.”228 A 
reserve army would not have this problem to the same degree as a 
permanent force. Reservists would generally partake in the same 
liberty as other American citizens, except in cases of emergency. Thus, 
the arguments against a standing army would have taken a different 
character if the power to “raise and support Armies” included the 
creation of a part-time auxiliary under exclusive federal control. 
Finally, combining the power to conscript with the power to 
create a reserve would make the constitutional limitations on the 
militia meaningless. If Congress could compel ordinary citizens to serve 
as part-time soldiers, this means that Congress could force the 
population to be available for national emergencies, while having none 
of the protections of the Militia Clauses. Part-time soldiers would not 
be governed by local officers, they could be forced to train anywhere in 
the world, and they could be subjected to military law at any time. 
These are all powers that were explicitly denied to the federal 
government at the Constitutional Convention. 
One might object that the National Guard differs from the U.S. 
Army Reserve because the states train the National Guard and appoint 
the officers,229 while federal officials train the U.S. Army Reserve and 
 
 226. Noah Webster, A Citizen of America (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 38, 40. 
 227. Other fears would have remained, especially if the military reserve force did not involve 
universal service. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 228. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV (Oct. 21, 1787), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 54, 55; see also Tench Coxe, Remarks on the First Part of 
the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, Moved on the 8th Instant in the House of 
Representatives, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, June 18, 1789, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 670, 671. 
 229. 32 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2012). 
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appoint its officers. Under this view, whether an organization is part of 
the “Armies” or part of the “Militia” depends on whether the force is 
organized pursuant to the Armies Clause or the Militia Clauses.230 
But classifying an armed force as an “army” or “militia” in this 
manner is a mistake because it confuses the limitations of the Militia 
Clauses with constitutive conditions for whether the military force is a 
“militia.” There is no evidence that the Framers understood the 
difference between “militia” and “armies” to consist in whether, for 
example, the officers were appointed by the states or the president. 
Instead, requiring the states to appoint militia officers was a restriction 
on federal authority over the militia. As David Currie said, “Congress 
cannot evade constitutional limitations simply by offending them.”231   
Thus, Congress lacks any constitutional power to create the U.S. 
Army Reserve. A reserve force, by definition, is a militia. The 
Constitution requires that the federal government and the states share 
control of part-time forces and that such forces may only be called into 
active federal service to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, or 
repel invasions. Just as states cannot generally keep regular troops, the 
federal government cannot maintain a militia vested in the federal 
government alone. 
C. Dual Enlistment of Officers 
In Federalist No. 29 and Federalist No. 46, Hamilton and 
Madison made clear that the militia serves as a counterbalance for the 
federal army. This federalism-based check on the military powers had 
three components. First, the people had to form a distinct body from the 
army. Second, the people had to be armed. Third, the militia required 
leadership.232 Only when an armed populace was competently led could 
it guarantee the “security of the free state.” The Framers sought to 
provide the militia with independent leadership—militia officers not 
beholden to the federal government or federal officeholders. 
Dual enlistment destroys this independent leadership because a 
condition of federal recognition of state National Guard units is that 
officers maintain their national commissions. Since 1933, all officers 
who are commissioned into the National Guard of a state are 
 
 230. National Guard officers, therefore, have to be commissioned under state law (as part of 
the organized militia) and under federal law (as part of the National Guard of the United States—
a part of the U.S. Army Reserve). 
 231. 1 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–
1801, 248 n.88 (1997). 
 232. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299–300 (James Madison). But not even 
Madison, who initially drafted the Second Amendment, thought that an armed populace was 
independently sufficient to guarantee a free country. 
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simultaneously commissioned into the National Guard of the United 
States, a reserve component of the U.S. Armed Forces.233 But only a 
limited class of people is eligible for federal recognition of their officer 
status.234 And federal law allows for federal recognition to be 
withdrawn,235 at which point the officer must be discharged by the 
state.236 Failure to discharge the officer would place the state at risk to 
lose appropriations, equipment, and other federal benefits for its 
National Guard.237 This dual-enlistment system destroys the 
separation that the Framers intended between militia officers and the 
federal government. 
Dividing control over the militia received considerable attention 
during the Constitutional Convention. Everyone recognized that the 
militia underperformed during and after the Revolution, and 
incompetent leadership was part of the problem. Edmund Randolph 
blamed state legislators, whom he thought were too interested in 
courting popular opinion to impose appropriate militia discipline.238 
Remedying the poor state of militia discipline became a central focus of 
the Militia Clauses. Two issues received close attention: who would 
train the militia and who would appoint the officers.239 
On August 21, 1787, a committee of eleven assigned to debate 
debts and the militia made the following proposal for congressional 
power: 
To make laws for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such 
part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the 
States respectively, the appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training the 
militia according to the discipline prescribed by the United States.240 
Debate on this proposal occurred on August 23, and a consensus 
emerged in its favor. The consensus was a compromise over several 
competing necessities: remedying the poor performance of the militia, 
having interoperability of the militia from different states when called 
into national service, the political reality that states would not give up 
total control over the militia, and the fact that the states may 
occasionally need their militia forces for internal security.241 
 
 233. National Guard Act of 1933, ch. 87, §§ 5–6, 11, 48 Stat. 153, 155–58.  
 234. 32 U.S.C. §§ 305–10 (2012). 
 235. 32 U.S.C. § 323 (2012). 
 236. 32 U.S.C. § 324(a)(2) (2012). 
 237. See 32 U.S.C. § 108 (2012) (“If . . . a State fails to comply with a requirement of this 
title . . . the National Guard of that State is barred, in whole or in part, as the President may 
prescribe, from receiving money or any other aid, benefit, or privilege authorized by law.”). 
 238. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 387. 
 239. See id. at 330–33, 384–89.  
 240. Id. at 352. 
 241. See id. at 385–87. 
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The proposal nationalized control over basic defense policy. The 
federal government would determine how much training the militia 
would have, what weapons the militiamen would possess, and how the 
militia would be organized. But that is as far toward nationalization as 
the Constitutional Convention was willing to go. As I described above,242 
reserving to the states the appointment of officers was not up for serious 
discussion; the Convention even beat back Madison’s modest proposal 
to allow the federal government to appoint the generals. Immediately 
after rejecting Madison’s proposal, the Convention passed the proposal 
to reserve to the states the appointment of officers without dissent.243 
Before the vote, Randolph noted, “Leaving the appointment of officers 
to the States protects the people [against] every apprehension that 
could produce murmur.”244 
During the debates over ratification of the Constitution, the 
Federalists—including (ironically) Madison—emphasized the 
reservation of the appointment power to the states as a bulwark against 
federal tyranny. Three separate times in Federalist No. 46, Madison 
asserted that any attempt by the federal army to effect national 
oppression would fail, in part, because an armed populace would be led 
by militia officers who would have their loyalty to the local population 
and state government. Madison wrote: 
[1] [Against a regular army] would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million 
of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, 
fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing 
their affections and confidence. . . . [2] Besides the advantage of being armed, which the 
Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of 
subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which the militia 
officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more 
insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. . . .  
[3] [Besides being armed] were the [European] people to possess the additional 
advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will 
and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia by these 
governments and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the 
greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily 
overturned in spite of the legions which surround it.245 
Even Hamilton—who was in the minority by advocating for 
standing armies and select militias—likewise argued that the state 
appointment of militia officers should allay concerns over transferring 
to the federal government significant authority over the militia. He 
asked: 
 
 242. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 243. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 388. 
 244. Id. at 387. 
 245. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299–300 (James Madison).  
Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:48 PM 
1032 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:989 
What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to 
prescribe regulations for the militia and to command its services when necessary, while 
the particular States are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the officers? If it 
were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable 
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the 
appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this 
circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.246 
Although much of the Militia Power (like the Constitution’s 
Elections Clause) has substantial areas where the federal government 
may require states to carry out federal mandates, the actual 
appointment of militia officers is not part of this concurrent authority. 
The Framers textually committed this power exclusively to state 
governments to provide for a second chain of command within the 
military forces. One military chain (the professional services) was 
beholden exclusively to the national government and national political 
leaders. The other chain (citizen-soldiers) owed its primary allegiance 
to the states and their local populace. This would help, first, to avoid 
national oppression (the prophylactic purpose). National political 
leaders would not command the personal loyalties of all military officers 
because they had no role in appointing militia officers. As a result, the 
authority of national leaders over the militia and militia officers would 
derive from the legitimacy of these political leaders’ actions; it could not 
come from some sense of personal obligation that militia officers felt 
toward the national leaders who appointed them. And second, in the 
unlikely event national oppression did occur, militia officers would lead 
the militia against these federal officers (the remedial purpose). This 
would not be possible without providing some separation between 
militia officers and federal political leaders. 
While it is true that the current National Guard system leaves 
the technical appointment of officers to state governments, the 
reservation of this formality does not satisfy the Militia Officer Clause. 
Through dual enlistment, the federal government has required the 
states to cede de facto control of their militia officer corps to the national 
government. Dual enlistment allows the federal government to 
federalize any militia officer at any time for any reason by simply 
exercising the Army Power.247 And states lack any power to prevent 
their militia officers from being used for nonmilitia federal duties.248 
Thus, by requiring National Guard officers to maintain a simultaneous 
 
 246. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 186 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 247. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 347–49 (1990) (stating that the congressional 
power to call forth the militia as a national army arises under the general Army Power of 
Congress). 
 248. See id. (holding that the governor of Minnesota could not prevent Congress from calling 
forth the National Guard for national purposes). 
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federal commission, the federal government has evaded its 
constitutional obligation to leave militia officers available for state duty 
outside the limited federalization authorized by the Militia Clauses. 
The dual-enlistment system also violates the Militia Officer 
Clause by transferring effective control over the discharge of militia 
officers to the federal government. On penalty of losing federal funds, 
states must discharge any militia officer who loses his federal 
recognition.249 Yet, in Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court 
recognized that “[t]he power of removal is incident to the power of 
appointment.”250 And in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court held that 
“Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer 
charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment” because 
“in practical terms, [it would] reserve in Congress control over the 
execution of the laws.”251 Quoting the district court in Bowsher, the 
Supreme Court explained that “[o]nce an officer is appointed, it is only 
the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that 
appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his 
functions, obey.”252 Under the current National Guard system, the 
federal government has de facto independent removal power of militia 
officers, including those not in active federal service. Militia officers, 
thus, must “fear” and “obey” federal military and civilian executive 
officials, even when they are not in performance of federal functions. 
This is exactly the result the Framers sought to avoid when (to quote 
Hamilton) they committed to the states the “sole and exclusive 
appointment of the officers.”253 
One might object that federal law does not require a state to 
maintain federal recognition. Federal recognition is merely a condition 
of receiving federal funds and equipment, to which states are not legally 
entitled. State governments may accept the federal funds—which 
curtails their authority over state officers—or they may decline the 
funds and exercise their power to the constitutional limit. In this sense, 
the dual-enlistment system is analogous to the National Minimum 
Drinking Age Act at issue in South Dakota v. Dole; that law required 
states to set twenty-one as the age to purchase or publicly possess 
alcohol, or they would lose five percent of their highway funds.254 
The Court in Dole articulated four restrictions on Congress’s 
Spending Power. First, the spending must be “in pursuit of ‘the general 
 
 249. 32 U.S.C. § 324(a)(2) (2012). 
 250. 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926). 
 251. 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
 252. Id. (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)). 
 253. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 186 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted).  
 254. 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987). 
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welfare’ ” (or, in this case, “for the common defense”).255 Second, the 
restriction must be unambiguous and, third, related to the federal 
program at issue.256 Fourth, the spending condition may not run afoul 
of other constitutional provisions that may “provide an independent 
bar.”257 The first three are not in serious consideration. Restricting 
National Guard funding to federally recognized units is in pursuit of 
the common defense, the restriction is unambiguous, and it is clearly 
related to providing more efficient, better trained military forces. The 
only question, then, is whether there is an independent constitutional 
bar. 
My argument is that the Militia Officer Clause serves as that 
independent constitutional bar. Structural considerations may imply 
some restrictions on conditional federal funding, whether those 
conditions are coercive or not.258 For example, Congress could not 
“condition federal funding to any degree on state authorities that 
themselves check or control federal authority, most notably state 
authority to select federal presidential electors or send two Senators to 
Congress.”259 The Militia Officer Clause is a similar kind of provision. 
This reservation of state authority encompasses more than formally 
extending officers’ commissions. It also implies having an effective 
choice as to which officers are selected and the power to decide whether 
those officers should be removed. The Framers intended the states to 
have the ability to make meaningful officer choices, apart from federal 
interference, to ensure the loyalty of militia officers to state 
governments and the people. 
Apart from these structural limitations on conditional federal 
funds, one could also object that granting the president power to 
withhold some or all federal funds from states that do not appoint and 
discharge militia officers as directed by federal authorities is 
unconstitutionally coercive.260 As Lynn Baker has explained, when 
states turn down federal conditional spending, “[t]here is no competitor 
 
 255. Id. at 207 (quoting Helverig v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937)). Because the 
Constitution grants Congress explicit power over the militia, militia spending does not implicate 
the debate between Hamilton and Madison over the scope of the Spending Clause. Even under the 
more restrictive Madisonian view, Congress has power to appropriate money for the militia. My 
thanks to Nelson Lund for raising this point. 
 256. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 257. Id. at 208. 
 258. See Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
357, 400 (2018).  
 259. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 260. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–85 (2012) (discussing 
whether congressional financial inducement qualifies as “so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion”). 
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to the federal government to which these states might turn for 
substitute financial assistance”; and the states’ power to tax directly is 
limited to “the income and property remaining to their residents and 
property owners after the federal government has taken its yearly share 
[of taxes].”261 The federal military budget approaches $700 billion.262 
States likely could not impose sufficient taxes on their population to 
maintain independent militia forces if they forewent all or most federal 
funds. States likely have no choice but to accept the National Guard 
system and thereby cede control over their militia officers to the federal 
government. 
 
*        *        * 
 
The federal government very much still relies on the militia 
system. We no longer call these forces “militia”; they are organized 
under names like “National Guard” and “U.S. Army Reserve.”263 And 
the militia no longer serves as a check on the national army; it has been 
consolidated into the army. The Supreme Court has allowed the federal 
government to concentrate all of the national military forces in one 
government, a result the Framers strived to avoid. 
III. SWALLOWING THE MILITIA WHOLE 
The Constitution gave Congress the power to raise an army. And 
the Constitution gave Congress the power to compel military service. 
This Part asks whether Congress can combine the two: May Congress 
compel military service in the army? I argue that Congress may not. 
Although obligatory military service is as old as civilization, 
conscription into a national, professional army has a shorter historical 
pedigree. Historians treat Napoleonic France’s levée en masse, which 
began in 1793, as the beginning of national conscription.264 The recent 
 
 261. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 
1936–37 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
 262. Office of the Under Sec’y of Def. (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 
2020, DEP’T DEF. 1 (May 2019), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/ 
fy2020/FY20_Green_Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW9W-UC4V]. 
 263. The present system is not unlike the trained bands of the Elizabethan era, which had a 
smaller organized force and a larger class of general citizens that, while largely going untrained, 
were nevertheless subject to military service. See BARNETT, supra note 29, at 34–35 (describing 
the system). 
 264. See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 90–91 (2012) (“In 1793, the world 
witnessed the first modern national draft—Revolutionary France’s levee en masse.”); Forrest 
Revere Black, The Selective Draft Cases—A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 11 B.U. 
L. REV. 37, 43 (1931); Harrop A. Freeman, The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA. 
L. REV. 40, 68 (1945). 
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origin of conscription should not come as a surprise. National armies 
require a strong central government to organize and maintain them.265 
Even today, in places where the central government is weak, local 
militia generally prevail over national armies.266 
Historically, in England and in this country, the strength of the 
central government has determined whether the government has relied 
on armies or a militia. The early English militia was an organization 
bred from necessity, not from a philosophical preference for the militia. 
The central government was weak and could not afford to field an army 
in sufficient numbers.267 The militia was inexpensive for the Crown: 
besides the fact that the militia members bought their own weapons, 
“only the Muster-Master in each county was a paid crown officer.”268 
The Assize of Arms, which reorganized the militia after the Norman 
Conquest, required English subjects to purchase military weapons and 
report for occasional military service.269 The American militia system 
had similar roots, forming long before a strong central government 
would have enough power to raise an army.270 
As explained in Part I, the Constitution organizes the American 
military into three bodies of forces. The federal government has plenary 
control over the professional services—the armies and navy—and with 
a few minor exceptions, the states have no role to play. The militia, in 
contrast, is organized by state with separate chains of command. The 
 
 265. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 32–33 (explaining that the professionalization 
of the military occurred with the development of the nation-state). 
 266. For a study on this phenomenon, see Ariel I. Ahram, The Origins and Persistence of State-
sponsored Militias: Path Dependent Processes in Third World Military Development, 34 J. 
STRATEGIC STUD. 531 (2011). 
 267. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 36. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Assize of Arms 1181, 27 Hen. 2, §§ 1–2 (Eng.); see MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 162. For 
example, a person who had a knight’s fee or a free man who had chattels or rents to the value of 
sixteen marks was required to obtain chainmail, a helmet, a sword, and a shield, whereas those 
free men who had property to the value of only ten marks had to possess a hauberk, iron cap, and 
a sword. Assize of Arms 1181, 27 Hen. 2. The Statute of Winchester, in 1285, updated the kinds of 
weapons militiamen were required to have, again regulated by their means: the statute divided 
the populace into five income groups and required universal service between ages sixteen and 
sixty. Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. c. 6 (Eng.); see MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 276. A later 
statute, during the reign of Philip and Mary, divided the country into ten classes. BARNETT, supra 
note 29, at 23.  
 270. WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 4: 
The American colonies in the seventeenth century were much too poor to permit a class 
of able-bodied men to devote themselves solely to war and preparation for war. Every 
colonist had to contribute all the energy he could to the economic survival of his colony, 
and no colony could afford to maintain professional soldiers.  
Before the Revolution, the colonists’ reliance on the militia would wax and wane depending on the 
colonies’ defense needs and the volunteer manpower available. See LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, 
CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND MILITIA IN AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 5–8, 45–
46 (1982). 
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federal government sets militia policy, and in emergencies, the federal 
government directly commands these forces, along with the 
professional army and navy. But outside these emergencies, the 
professional and nonprofessional services can serve as checks on each 
other. 
The final major blow to the federalism-based check on federal 
power occurred when the federal government assumed the power to 
draft into the regular army. The power to conscript soldiers destroyed 
the separation between “militia” and “army.” In this Part, I will make 
two arguments. First, although I acknowledge that it is a close 
constitutional question, the power to use conscription to raise armies 
runs afoul of structural limitations on the federal government’s use of 
its power to raise armies, as those limitations were understood. Second, 
to the extent that a power of conscription is recognized at all, that power 
extends only to a draft into the regular army. The federal government 
has no power to draft into the army reserve. 
A. The Unconstitutionality of Conscription into the National Army 
Let me begin by providing the strongest argument in favor of 
conscription’s constitutionality. The Constitution provides that the 
Congress shall have the power “[t]o raise and support Armies, but no 
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years.”271 The text states nothing about how the armies are to be raised. 
Consequently, read in total isolation (and, a fortiori, in conjunction with 
the Necessary and Proper Clause), the provision appears to support 
either voluntary enlistment or a draft. 
Debates during and after the Constitutional Convention give 
some meat to this argument: proposals to limit the Army Power were 
rejected consistently, including some with purely cautionary 
language.272 The Constitutional Convention only passed two 
amendments to the power to “raise Armies.” One amendment added 
“support” after the power to “raise”—which expanded the Army 
Power.273 The only amendment cabining the Army Power was the 
limitation that Congress could not appropriate funds for armies for 
more than two years.274 After the state ratifying conventions, as 
 
 271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 272. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 616–17 (rejecting George Mason’s attempt to inscribe 
in the Militia Clause “and that the liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger 
of standing armies in time of peace”). 
 273. Id. at 323. 
 274. Id. at 505. Elbridge Gerry unsuccessfully proposed limiting the number of men, while 
Charles Pinckney introduced language to prohibit keeping troops in time of peace except with the 
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proposals for the Bill of Rights were discussed, none of the proposals to 
limit the army (e.g., by requiring a supermajority of Congress) or to 
declare the army “dangerous to liberty” passed.275 
Moreover, the contemporary commentary also discussed the 
breadth of this power. Speaking of the military powers (including the 
Army Power), Hamilton, in Federalist No. 23, wrote: 
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to 
define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and 
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that 
endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles 
can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. . . . [T]here can 
be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the 
community in any matter essential to its efficacy—that is, in any matter essential to the 
formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES.276 
One commentator, discussing Hamilton’s writing and the refusal of the 
Convention and Congress to limit the Army Power, has said that the 
limitations on the Army Power are procedural, not substantive.277 
Unlike the seventeenth-century Crown in England, the Constitution 
does not permit the executive to raise armies sua sponte; only Congress 
can do this.278 Standing armies without Congress’s consent, therefore, 
are impossible. 
The Supreme Court used a textual and selectively historical 
reading of the Army Power when it first upheld Congress’s power to 
conscript in the Selective Draft Law Cases.279 During World War I, 
Congress passed an act authorizing the draft, only the second 
conscription act in U.S. history.280 The appellants in these cases were 
convicted of refusing to register for the draft.281 In defense, they argued, 
inter alia, that Congress lacked the power to institute a draft and that 
the power to draft interfered with operation of the Militia Clauses.282 
 
legislature’s consent and limiting the appropriations for “military [l]and forces” for one year. See 
id. at 323 (stating that a proposed amendment to limit the number of men was unsuccessful); id. 
at 329 (discussing the Pinckney proposal); id. at 341 (“No grants of money shall be made by the 
Legislature for supporting military Land forces, for more than one year at a time.”). 
 275. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 276. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 24, at 153–54 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 277. Michael J. Malbin, Conscription, the Constitution, and the Framers: An Historical 
Analysis, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 805, 814 (1972). 
 278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. II. 
 279. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 376–78 (1918). 
 280. An Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of 
the United States, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76. The first conscription act was passed by Congress 
during the Civil War and is discussed below since its validity was never ruled on by the federal 
courts. See An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes, ch. 
75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863). 
 281. Arver, 245 U.S. at 376. 
 282. Id. at 376–77. 
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The Court unanimously—and somewhat perfunctorily—rejected 
these arguments. First, the Court argued that the Army Power would 
be useless if Congress could not compel military service.283 Since an 
army must comprise soldiers, the Court argued, an Army Power that 
depended on citizens voluntarily enlisting for military service would be 
useless because citizens could nullify the Army Power by withholding 
their consent to enlist.284 An Army Power that did not include the power 
to conscript would reduce the government to something less than a true 
sovereign, for the exercise of power sometimes requires compulsion.285 
The Court then provided some historical and textual reasons to 
support Congress’s power to conscript. The Court discussed briefly some 
history of required military service in Anglo-American law, from before 
the Norman Conquest to the American colonies.286 (It is important to 
note that the Court ignores that these statutes regulated military 
service in the militia, not in the professional, standing army.) Textually, 
the Court noted that the Militia Power is separate from the Army 
Power.287 According to the Court, the Militia Power grants additional 
authority to Congress to regulate military forces, but the Militia Power 
is not a limitation on the Army Power.288 Thus, the Court held that 
Congress’s exertion of the Army Power did not impede the Militia 
Power, despite Congress having drafted most of the militia into the 
federal army.289 
The Court then bolstered its historical argument. It noted that 
President Madison and his Secretary of War James Monroe proposed a 
federal draft for the War of 1812. The Court did not seriously consider 
the opposition to the draft in 1812, saying that it “substantially rested 
upon the incompatibility of compulsory military service with free 
government” rather than on constitutional objections.290 Finally, the 
Court examined the Civil War precedent.291 It referenced that President 
Lincoln successfully instituted a draft in 1863, which was affirmed by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kneedler v. Lane,292 and that 
Confederate courts had likewise upheld the Confederate draft under 
their analogous constitutional provisions.293 
 
 283. Id. at 377. 
 284. Id. at 377–78. 
 285. Id. at 378. 
 286. Id. at 378–79. 
 287. Id. at 382. 
 288. Id. at 382–84. 
 289. Id. at 377–78. 
 290. Id. at 385. 
 291. Id. at 386–88. 
 292. 45 Pa. 238 (1863). 
 293. Arver, 245 U.S. at 386. 
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The Court’s first argument—that the Army Power would be 
useless without conscription—is quite weak. As Leon Friedman 
previously argued, the “necessity argument” could be applied to any 
federal power: the post office, the mint, even the federal judiciary.294 
But the need of a federal entity to have individuals to populate it does 
not imply that Congress possesses the power to compel individuals to 
serve in that entity.295 For example, Congress is not thought to possess 
the power to draft postal carriers or federal judges.296 The power to 
provide for a postal service most naturally confers on the federal 
government the authority to employ persons as postal carriers to 
transmit the mail. The government populates the post office by 
participating in the labor market and offering sufficient wages to 
attract postal employees. Similarly, the Army Power authorizes the 
federal government to raise an army by voluntary enlistment, which is 
the manner in which armies had theretofore been raised. Nor is this a 
trivial conferral of power, for the federal government arguably lacked 
any power to enlist professional soldiers in peacetime under the Articles 
of Confederation. 
Moreover, the textual argument appears weaker when one looks 
across constitutional text, rather than just at the Army and Militia 
Clauses in isolation. The Fifth Amendment begins, “No person shall be 
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger . . . .”297 Here, the Framers clearly 
differentiated the professional forces and the militia. The professional 
services are always subject to military law, whether or not they are in 
active service; a member of the army can be court-martialed for 
activities that occur off-duty with no nexus to his service.298 But the 
authority over the militia is different: the government can only apply 
military law “when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”299 
This limitation on federal power over the militia resulted from the 
Framers’ desire to secure against a potential loophole in constitutional 
criminal procedure rights. Because the militia encompasses all able-
bodied men who are members of the political community, generally 
 
 294. See Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1497–98 (1969). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See id. (“No one ever suggested before the Arver case that any other enumerated power 
included authority to compel service in the governmental organization involved.”). 
 297. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 298. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436, 450–51 (1987). 
 299. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
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exempting the militia would have allowed the federal government to 
subject most of the political community to military law at all times. Men 
would only have had ordinary criminal procedure rights when they 
were infants or well within middle age.300 The Fifth Amendment 
exemption was thus not a federalism provision that divided when state 
forces would be subject to federal discipline. Quite the contrary, it was 
a personal right to secure American able-bodied men against being 
subjected to federal military law, except when performing federal 
military duties. Recognizing a broad power to conscript undermines this 
protection.301 
Interpreting the Army Clause as encompassing the power to 
conscript also unwinds the protection of the original Militia Clauses. 
Congress may call forth the militia only “to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”302 And the 
Training Clause reserves to the states “the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”303 These 
constitutional limitations, which are similar to British limitations on 
the militia, protected American citizens from burdensome travel for 
military purposes, except in cases of national emergency.304 Without 
 
 300. See, e.g., Maryland Ratifying Convention, supra note 49, at 734 (remarking that “all other 
provisions in favor of the rights of men would be vain and nugatory, if the power of subjecting all 
men, able to bear arms, to martial law at any moment should remain vested in Congress”); Luther 
Martin, Address No. 1, MD. J., Mar. 18, 1788, in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, supra note 115, at, 397, 401 (cautioning against federal 
militia conscription by likening conscription “contrary to the will of the state” to “martial law” and 
slavery); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to 
their Constituents, PHILA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 164, 201, 220 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“The personal 
liberty of every man, probably from sixteen to sixty years of age, may be destroyed by the power 
Congress ha[s] in [the] organizing and governing of the militia.”); Foreign Spectator, Remarks on 
the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, Proposed by the Conventions of Massachusetts, New-
Hampshire, New-York, Virginia, South and North-Caroline, with the Minorities of Pennsylvania 
and Maryland, by a Foreign Spectator: Number VIII, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1788, 
reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 567, 569–70 (“A citizen, 
as a militia man is to perform duties which are different from the usual transaction of civil society; 
and which consequently must be enforced by congenial laws and regulation.”). 
 301. This is especially true if the power to conscript includes the power to conscript into the 
army reserve. If the federal government can conscript part-time citizen-soldiers (a power I deny 
below), the Army and Militia Powers become totally coextensive, except that the federal 
government can avoid the constitutional limitations on the militia by purporting to raise the force 
using its Army Power. 
 302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 303. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 304. British law prohibited marching the militia out of one’s county, except in cases of invasion 
or rebellion—a law that ceased burdensome foreign militia deployments occurring during the 
reigns of King Edward II and King Edward III. Statute the Second 1326, 1 Edw. 3 c. 5 (Eng.); 1 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *398; MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 277; see also Militia Act 1776, 
16 Geo. 3 c. 3 (Gr. Brit.) (prohibiting sending militia out of the county, except in cases of invasion 
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these limitations, many Antifederalists feared that the federal 
government would subject the militia to harsh punishments and other 
burdens, such as for travel, and these burdens would cause Americans 
to support raising a standing army in place of performing militia 
service.305 Yet, through conscription, Congress can evade the 
limitations on its Militia Power by requiring citizens to perform 
military service in the army rather than in the militia. 
Congress’s modern use of the Army Power as a supplement to 
the Militia Power came about in the early 1900s precisely to avoid the 
limitations on the Militia Clauses.306 During the early twentieth 
century, the United States engaged in military actions overseas.307 
Congress wanted to use state National Guards to supplement regular 
forces, but Attorney General George Wickersham opined that the 
militia could not generally be used beyond the country’s borders.308 By 
simultaneously enrolling citizens in both a state Guard and an army 
reserve unit, Congress sought to access these forces for international 
missions by calling them out as “armies” rather than as “militias.” 
Authorizing conscription thus unwinds the personal liberties the 
Framers placed in the original Constitution concerning military service. 
It leaves the general citizenry subject to military law at Congress’s 
whim. Congress may send conscripted citizens to foreign countries to 
train and fight, and as long as Congress places an “army” label on them, 
the restrictions on the federal government calling forth the militia or 
selecting the officers no longer apply. Even if the power to raise armies, 
when read in isolation, would support a power to conscript soldiers, the 
power to conscript soldiers does violence to many other constitutional 
provisions when the Constitution is read more holistically. 
To analogize to criminal prosecutions, it is as if Congress had 
passed a law providing, “Failure to pay taxes results in a civil penalty 
of life in prison,” and then authorized a nonjury trial before an 
administrative officer. Congress cannot avoid the Bill of Rights by 
 
or rebellion); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16 (limiting the ability to call forth the militia and 
reserving to the states the authority of training the militia). 
 305. See Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), supra note 93, at 1300–01 
(statement of Patrick Henry); id. at 1303–04 (statements of George Mason). The Court in Perpich 
seems to miss this point completely. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 350–51 (1990) 
(failing to discuss the history behind the inclusion of the Training Clause). 
 306. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 23. 
 307. See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 295–341 (discussing sending U.S. forces abroad 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the reorganization of the U.S. military 
to accommodate such endeavors).  
 308. Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322 (Feb. 17, 
1912). 
Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:48 PM 
2020] FEDERALISM AND THE MILITARY POWER 1043 
labeling a crime as a civil penalty.309 Likewise, Congress cannot avoid 
the restrictions on the Militia Clauses by calling the militia an “army.”  
Moreover, the historical record is not as favorable as the 
Selective Draft Law Cases suggest. Although England had 
impressment, it mainly affected the drunk and idle as punishment.310 
Conscription bills that were introduced in British Parliament in 1704 
and 1707 were attacked as unconstitutional,311 as was Madison and 
Monroe’s conscription proposal. The Court noted that Daniel Webster 
objected to conscription on general principles of free government—
which he did. But he also objected to the plan as a violation of the 
Constitution because it sought to avoid the limitations on the Militia 
Clauses by relabeling the militia as an “army”: 
But, Sir, there is another consideration. The services of the men to be raised under this 
act are not limited to those cases in which alone this Government is entitled to the aid of 
the militia of the States. These cases are particularly stated in the Constitution—“to repel 
invasion, suppress insurrection, or execute the laws.” But this bill has no limitation in 
this respect . . . . 
This, then, Sir, is a bill for calling out the Militia not according to its existing organization, 
but by draft from new created classes;—not merely for the purpose of “repelling invasion, 
suppressing insurrection, or executing the laws,” but for the general objects of war—for 
defending ourselves, or invading others, as may be thought expedient;—not for a sudden 
emergency, or for a short time, but for long stated periods . . . . What is this, Sir, but 
raising a standing army out of the Militia by draft, & to be recruited by draft, in like 
manner, as often as occasion may require?312 
Ultimately, the conscription bills died in Congress when the House and 
Senate could not resolve their differences over conscripts’ length of 
service.313   
Conscription would not reemerge until the Civil War when 
Congress passed the Enrollment Act in 1863. The Act authorized the 
president to conscript, with some exceptions, citizens (and those 
intending to become citizens) between the ages of twenty and forty-
five.314 The Act was not a full conscription act since the draftee could 
 
 309. See Int’l Union, Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 838 (1994) (holding 
that “the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative” in the context of 
a debate regarding whether it was sufficient to label a fine as a civil penalty in order to proceed 
with using process associated with civil proceedings); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 
U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (finding that functions, not labels, determine whether a fee is a tax or a 
penalty). 
 310. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 41. 
 311. Freeman, supra note 264, at 68–69. 
 312. Daniel Webster, An Unpublished Speech, in THE MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS 
ON CONSCRIPTION, supra note 212, at 633, 634–35 (December 9, 1814 speech on the conscription 
bill made on the floor of the House of Representatives). 
 313. See 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 157–58. 
 314. An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes, ch. 75, 
§ 1, 12 Stat. 731 (1863). 
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hire a substitute at a cost of up to $300, so it operated as a choice 
between compulsory military service or paying a fee.315 
Like conscription during the War of 1812, the Enrollment Act 
was vigorously resisted. The Act resulted in riots in several cities, 
including New York City in July of 1863.316 No federal court challenge 
made it to the Supreme Court. Anticipating a challenge, Chief Justice 
Taney prepared a draft opinion holding the Enrollment Act to be 
unconstitutional.317 He approached the militia/army dichotomy from a 
different perspective than my argument above. In his view, the militia 
and the army were quite separate organizations under different 
sovereign authorities.318 State governments were independent 
sovereigns—to the point where the Constitution did not authorize the 
federal government to quell internal rebellions against the state 
without a specific request from state authorities.319 For Chief Justice 
Taney, the militia belonged to the states as their sovereign force.320 The 
militia was a force over which “the general government can exercise no 
power in time of peace, and but a limited and specified power in time of 
war.”321 The army, in contrast, comprised men separated from the 
general body of citizens and subjected to exclusive federal authority.322 
Recognizing the power to draft would destroy state governments and 
the state militia. Nothing would stop the federal government, for 
example, from drafting state judges and making them privates in the 
national army.323 A power to draft, thus, would leave entire state 
governments at the mercy of federal legislation. The state would not 
have any real power over its militia because the federal government 
could draft the entire militia into the federal army. Given that the 
Constitution specifically laid out emergency federal military powers, 
including the power to use all the militia from every state, Chief Justice 
 
 315. § 13, 12 Stat. at 733; see also AMAR, supra note 264, at 91 (“Because the 1863 law allowed 
individual draftees to buy their way out—by providing a substitute or paying a fee—many 
supporters claimed the law was technically a tax and not a system of direct conscription.”). 
 316. See LESLIE M. HARRIS, IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN NEW YORK 
CITY, 1626–1863, at 279–85 (2003); MAHON, supra note 160, at 103. 
 317. Taney, supra note 212, at 208–18. 
 318. Id. at 211–12. 
 319. Id. at 207, 217 (“For in the case of rebellion or insurrection against the State government, 
the United States is not allowed to interfere in it, to support the State authority, unless its 
assistance is applied for by the Legislature of the State or by the Executive where the Legislature 
cannot be convened . . . .”). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 211. 
 322. Id. at 210–11. 
 323. Id. at 216. 
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Taney opined that recognizing the power to draft into the army would 
make the Constitution internally inconsistent.324 
While the constitutionality of the Enrollment Act never made it 
to the federal Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did 
have an opportunity to address its constitutionality in Kneedler v. 
Lane.325 In that case, a heavily divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
originally held the federal draft to be unconstitutional by a 3-2 vote, 
only to reverse itself immediately.326 Chief Justice Lowrie’s original 
opinion—which would ultimately be reversed—relied on similar 
arguments to Chief Justice Taney’s draft opinion. Chief Justice Lowrie 
argued that military necessity could not justify conscription. If the 
standing army was insufficient to put down the Confederate rebellion, 
he argued that the Constitution provided the means for more troops: 
calling forth the militia.327 The contemporary disorganization of the 
militia, Lowrie thought, was irrelevant: Congress had the power to 
organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and, having long known of the 
problem, it could correct this situation by legislation.328 And drafting 
the able-bodied male population into the army during a rebellion 
constituted a de facto calling forth of the militia—but done in a way that 
subverts the structural limitations placed within the Constitution.329 
Given that the Constitution specifically provided for how the able-
bodied populace was to be called forth during such an emergency, Chief 
Justice Lowrie was loath to find this same power—but without the 
restrictions over the militia—in the Army Clause.330 
Moreover, recognizing a general power to conscript would work 
enormous mischief to state governments. The army would have the 
power to totally consume the militia, thereby leaving the states 
defenseless to internal disturbances. Even militia officers—who were 
 
 324. See id. at 212–13; see also Coxe, supra note 209, at 431, 435–36 (describing a militia-
based check of the federal army); Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of 
the Federal Constitution (October 10, 1787), in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra 
note 27, at 38, 39 (“[Congress is not] at liberty to call out the militia at pleasure—but only, to 
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. For these purposes, 
government must always be armed with a military force . . . .”). 
 325. 45 Pa. 238 (1863). 
 326. Id. at 240, 252, 274, 294–95.  
 327. Id. at 242. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See id at 244–45 (stating that drafting all men from twenty to forty-five “exhausts [the 
militia] entirely” and creates an “unauthorized substitute for the militia of the states,” completely 
“annul[ling], for the time being, the remedy for insurrection provided by the constitution”). 
 330. Id. at 242–43. A fortiori, one could apply Chief Justice Lowrie’s reasoning to the army 
reserve, which gives the federal government the same type of part-time force as a militia, without 
the restrictions contained in the Militia Clauses. See 10 U.S.C. § 10102 (2012) (describing the 
reserves’ purpose to supplement the regular forces in an emergency). 
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supposed to be separate from the federal army—would be subject to a 
draft, thereby leaving the militia without leadership.331 And nothing in 
the Constitution would prohibit drafting state officials, leaving the 
entire state government at the mercy of Congress’s whims regarding 
who to conscript.332 
The dissenters focused on the unqualified nature of the Army 
Clause; its only limitation is that appropriations not exceed two 
years.333 They further argued that the federal government possesses the 
same attributes of sovereignty as any other nation, one of which is to 
compel military service of its citizens.334 And service in the army—as 
opposed to the militia—may be required for the United States to defend 
its treaties and fulfill its foreign policy obligations.335 Moreover, the 
dissenters noted, Britain practiced impressing soldiers and sailors, 
Parliament had debated conscription bills at various times in the 
eighteenth century, and the American colonies regularly required 
military service.336 
Ultimately, the dissenters’ opinion carried the day. Chief Justice 
Lowrie left the Pennsylvania Supreme Court shortly after the original 
decision was issued. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court immediately 
reversed itself and dissolved the injunction against the Enrollment 
Act.337 
I have argued above for why the textual and structural 
arguments made by the original dissent are unpersuasive. But one 
further point in the Kneedler dissent must be addressed. As the 
dissenters correctly explain, the history of impressment poses a 
significant challenge to those arguing for the unconstitutionality of 
conscription.338 Impressment became popular in Elizabethan England 
because the country was engaged in foreign wars, and the militia was 
 
 331. Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 246. 
 332. Id. at 245–46. 
 333. See id. at 276 (Strong, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the clause conferring authority to raise armies, 
no limitation is imposed other than [the appropriation restriction], either upon the magnitude of 
the force which Congress is empowered to raise . . . or upon the mode in which the army may be 
raised.”). 
 334. Id. at 275. 
 335. Id. at 275–76. 
 336. See id. at 278–79 (recalling that Britain passed a law allowing all unemployed men to be 
conscripted and that states had used the draft as a last resort); id. at 290–91 (Read, J., dissenting) 
(responding to the majority’s argument that the Framers contemplated voluntary enlistment 
because that was what Britain used and noting that Britain had long used impressment for both 
the British army and navy). 
 337. See id. at 295 (majority opinion of Strong, J.) (disclaiming the authority to issue the 
injunction in the first place and dissolving the injunction). 
 338. An impressed soldier or sailor is forcibly abducted into service under color of law (e.g., 
lawfully taken from the tavern and forced to serve), whereas a conscript is merely required to 
report for induction. 
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not liable to serve outside of the kingdom. With the inability to recruit 
sufficient numbers of enlistments, the Crown demanded specific 
numbers of troops by commissions of array, and lords-lieutenant filled 
the quota with impressment.339 
The legality of impressment fell into a murky area. No statute 
ever authorized impressment of soldiers or sailors. At best, 
parliamentary statutes tacitly assumed the validity of the practice.340 
Those who were impressed were often unemployed, drunk, or petty 
criminals.341 Impressment into the army also only occurred when 
Britain was involved in foreign wars; Britain did not maintain a 
standing army in peacetime.342 Maitland further notes that the pressing 
of soldiers was far more controversial than the pressing of sailors; the 
former was the subject of several parliamentary petitions, while the 
latter escaped notice.343 To the extent that impressment may be viewed 
as a historical antecedent to conscription, the legitimacy of conscription 
into the navy may stand on a firmer footing than conscription into the 
army.344 But the precedent of impressment—which the Constitution 
does not explicitly ban—also illustrates why the constitutionality of the 
draft is a close and difficult question.    
Some commentators, recognizing the problematic nature of the 
draft, have offered new justifications for its legitimacy. The first theory 
is from Akhil Amar. Amar looks to the history surrounding the adoption 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.345 These came about, 
first, because the Union Army—in part, a conscripted army—defeated 
the South. The militia system disintegrated during the Civil War, with 
Southern states defecting completely and Northern states unable to 
supply enough troops or training to deal with the crisis adequately.346 
Second, the Reconstruction Army (which was not conscripted) 
maintained republican government in the South after the Civil War.347 
 
 339. See BARNETT, supra note 29, at 41. 
 340. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *418–19 (noting that a statute from 1378, 2 Rich. 2 
c. 4, refers to “mariners being arrested and retained for the king’s service”); MAITLAND, supra note 
32, at 278 (writing that a 1557 act, 4 & 5 Phil. & M. c. 3, “speaks of mustering and levying men to 
serve in the wards as a recognized legal practice”); see also MALCOLM, supra note 34, at 3–5 
(detailing that a tax helped pay for the king’s armies, which were organized by local magnates like 
lords-lieutenant). 
 341. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 41–42. Wealthier and otherwise virtuous citizens found ways 
to avoid impressment by providing substitutes or bribing justices of the peace. Id. at 42. 
 342. MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 279. 
 343. Id. at 280. 
 344. See, e.g., Taney, supra note 212, at 213–14 (considering this possibility). 
 345. AMAR, supra note 29, at 91. 
 346. Id. at 90–91. But see MAHON, supra note 160, at 103 (“[C]onscription swept in only 6 
percent of the total Union force.”). 
 347. AMAR, supra note 29, at 91. 
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Given that nothing in the Constitution explicitly prohibits a draft—
these are underlying structural interpretations of the Militia and Army 
Clauses—Amar argues that our understanding of how these clauses 
interact should change in light of the primacy of the Union Army in 
preserving “the security of a free State” during Reconstruction.348 Amar 
concludes, “No longer could it be insisted that the localist militia was 
always America’s constitutionally preferred force structure to vindicate 
the Constitution’s deepest values and secure its most sacred 
principles.”349 
A second, related theory is offered by David Yassky, who argues 
that the Fourteenth Amendment legitimized the draft.350 The 
Amendment made national citizenship primary—and one of the duties 
of national citizenship is military service in the army. The militia, 
Yassky argues, was viewed as the defender of Southern slavery 
compared with the liberating Union Army.351 Moreover, the Civil War 
changed which government citizens viewed as threatening liberty. Prior 
to the Civil War, citizens were mainly afraid of federal power. After the 
Civil War, citizens viewed state governments as more threatening.352 
These arguments present numerous substantive and 
methodological difficulties, only some of which I will respond to here. 
First, I disagree with the premise that the “localist militia was always 
America’s constitutionally preferred force structure to vindicate the 
Constitution’s deepest values.”353 This premise is partially true. Though 
there were some outliers (e.g., Alexander Hamilton), other things equal, 
most of the Framers preferred the militia system to a professional army. 
But many Framers realized that often other things were not equal (e.g., 
state governments being derelict in defense matters), which caused 
them to authorize a strong federal role in national defense. More 
pertinently, the Framers inscribed their distrust of state governments 
into the Constitution. Thus, Article IV grants the federal government 
the power to guarantee a “Republican Form of Government” to the 
states, which it can enforce using federal military power.354 Article I, 
Section 10 prohibits states from having a professional army or navy in 
peacetime without Congress’s consent.355 And the Constitution 
 
 348. U.S. CONST. amend. II; AMAR, supra note 29, at 91–92 (arguing that a textualist approach 
to the Constitution does not capture developments that were necessary to the survival of the 
United States). 
 349. AMAR, supra note 264, at 91. 
 350. Yassky, supra note 98, at 638–47. 
 351. Id. at 647. 
 352. Id. 
 353. AMAR, supra note 264, at 91. 
 354. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–44 (1849). 
 355. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
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conferred on Congress the power to use federal and militia forces to 
defend federal authority.356 The militia may “always have been 
preferred,” but the use of federal troops during Reconstruction was also 
in keeping with the spirit (and letter) of the original Constitution. The 
federalism-based checks on the military power were reciprocal, not one-
sided: the Framers recognized that the states could also misuse their 
power. Viewed in this light, I disagree that Reconstruction marks the 
paradigm shift that Amar and Yassky argue. 
A second difficulty is that Amar’s and Yassky’s conclusions do 
not follow from their premises. Two important differences between the 
Army Clause and Militia Clauses are that (1) the army is available for 
foreign wars, whereas the Militia Clauses apply only to domestic 
emergencies; and (2) the militia cannot be subjected to military law, 
except when in actual service. Whatever the lessons from the Civil War 
and Reconstruction, they do not seem relevant to making citizens liable 
to serve in foreign wars and to always be subject to military law. 
Allowing the federal government to exercise these powers does not 
follow from the reversal of seeing state governments—rather than the 
federal government—as the primary danger to civil liberties. 
To conclude, conscription into the regular army is likely 
unconstitutional as an original matter, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
should not be construed to grant that power. Recognizing federal power 
to conscript into the army does immense violence to the limitations of 
the Militia Clauses and the personal rights of citizens available for 
temporary military duty. An unlimited power to conscript effectively 
gives the federal government a national militia without the 
constitutional restrictions. Moreover, if Congress can draft the entire 
militia into the army, the militia cannot serve as a counterbalance to 
the army. The result, again, is one body of troops, not the separate 
bodies envisioned by the constitution that provide checks on each 
other’s power. 
 
 356. During the Pennsylvania Mutiny of 1783, Revolutionary War veterans marched on the 
Pennsylvania State House, causing Congress to flee to New Jersey. Congress tried, but failed, to 
secure the Pennsylvania militia to protect them. The event led the Framers to authorize both a 
federal city to host the seat of government and direct authority to use force to suppress 
insurrections against federal authority. See 3 STORY, supra note 140, § 1214; Kenneth R. Bowling, 
New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the Close of the War 
for Independence, 101 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 419, 420 (1977); David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
775, 847 (1994). 
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B. Conscription into the Reserves 
Those who have examined the constitutionality of the draft 
generally have considered two issues: first, whether the federal 
government has the power to conscript into the army or if, instead, the 
power to conscript is limited to the militia; and second, whether the 
power to institute a draft extends to peacetime—or, alternatively, to 
conflict in the absence of a declared war.357 But there is a third, more 
nuanced issue: Assuming arguendo that Congress has some power to 
conscript into the army, does that power extend to conscription in the 
army reserve? Although resumption of the draft seems unlikely in the 
near term, occasional bills to reinstate the draft have proposed 
authorizing federal conscription into the reserve forces.358 This Section 
argues that conscription into the reserves is patently unconstitutional 
and that, even accepting the legitimacy of the draft into the army, the 
Supreme Court would have strong reasons to limit Congress’s 
conscription power to drafting citizens as full-time, regular soldiers. 
The Supreme Court has not decided the precise scope of the 
federal government’s conscription power. In the Selective Draft Law 
Cases, the Court upheld the World War I conscription law on the basis 
of the powers to declare war, raise armies, make rules for land forces, 
and make laws that are necessary and proper.359 Draft opponents 
during Vietnam seized on this language and challenged the 
constitutionality of the draft in the absence of a declaration of war by 
Congress. Lower courts rejected these arguments, and the Supreme 
Court never granted certiorari to hear their claims.360 The Selective 
Draft Law Cases had held that the Militia Clauses did not limit the 
federal draft power, and all cases since then have used broad language 
to describe Congress’s power to raise forces using the Army Power. In 
United States v. O’Brien, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, 
 
 357. See supra notes 264 (examining a draft at peacetime), 277 (examining army conscription), 
& 294 (rebutting the “necessity argument” for conscription). 
 358. See, e.g., Universal National Service Act of 2003, H.R. 163, 108th Cong. § 2(b)(1) 
(proposing a mandatory two-year period of national service that could include service in the 
reserves). 
 359. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918) (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 360. See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 936 (1968) (denying certiorari); id. at 
936–49 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I think we owe to those who are being marched off to jail for 
maintaining that a declaration of war is essential for conscription an answer to this important 
undecided constitutional question.”); see also Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 
245, 265–66 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (noting that the Court had not decided peacetime 
draft limits). 
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said that “[t]he power of Congress to classify and conscript manpower 
for military service is ‘beyond question.’ ”361 
Even if Congress undoubtedly has the power of conscription, it 
does not follow that this power extends to the army reserve. As the 
previous Section explains, whether the federal government had the 
power to conscript people into the regular army was a difficult question 
at the Framing. In contrast, early congressional debates demonstrate 
beyond peradventure that the federal government lacked the power to 
conscript citizens into a federal reserve force. 
Although the concept of a permanent reserve corps dates from 
the early twentieth century, Congress created a temporary reserve-like 
force in 1799 during the undeclared war with France.362 Congress 
authorized the president to create a provisional army, if the president 
deemed it necessary in the event of war, invasion, or imminent danger 
of invasion.363 As part of that army, the president could accept voluntary 
associations of individuals who offered themselves as artillery, cavalry, 
or infantry units.364 These individuals would arm and equip themselves, 
would have officers appointed by the president, and would be liable to 
serve “at any time the President shall judge proper” for a period of two 
years after the president accepted their willingness to serve.365 These 
voluntary associations, only when in actual service, would be governed 
by the same rules and regulations as the army and would receive the 
same pay as regular soldiers. 
While Congress ultimately enacted the provision without 
amendment, the authorization of volunteers triggered a heated—and 
heavily partisan—constitutional controversy. Democratic-Republicans 
in the House attacked the provision on two constitutional grounds: first, 
the provision violated the requirement that militia officers be appointed 
by the states, and second, the law authorized the president to call forth 
these volunteer forces outside of the purposes enumerated in the Militia 
Clauses.366 If the volunteers constituted “militia,” then the Republicans 
correctly protested the provision. But if the volunteers were part of the 
army, then the Constitution vested the appointment in the president, 
who could command them outside the purposes enumerated in the 
 
 361. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 756 (1948)). 
 362. On the debate in Congress, see 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 248–50. 
 363. An Act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a Provisional Army, ch. 47, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 558, 558 (1798). 
 364. § 3, 1 Stat. at 558 (authorizing and regulating volunteers). 
 365. § 3, 1 Stat. at 558.  
 366. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1740 (Joseph Gales ed., 1851) (1798) (statement of Rep. 
McDowell) (noting that the volunteers would not be constrained by the three purposes of calling 
forth the militia); id. at 1704 (statement of Rep. Sumter) (arguing that the provision violated the 
Militia Officer Clause); id. at 1703 (same). 
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Militia Clauses. The critical question, then, was whether these 
volunteers were constitutionally part of the “army” or the “militia.” 
The Federalists argued that the volunteers constituted part of 
the army. Two arguments emerged in favor of this view. 
Representatives Samuel Dana, Robert Harper, and Harrison Gray Otis 
argued that the voluntariness of service marked the dividing line 
between a militiaman and a regular soldier: members of the militia 
were conscripted into service, whereas members of the army 
volunteered.367 Here, the volunteers were not conscripted; they offered 
their services for a limited time, just like a regular enlistment contract. 
The only difference was that the volunteers’ service was more limited 
than the service of full-time soldiers, but this difference in amount of 
service did not trigger a difference in kind about whether these 
individuals still constituted army troops.368 Representatives Samuel 
Sitgreaves and Robert Harper argued that because the volunteers were 
not subject to the limitations of the militia (e.g., they could be used for 
purposes beyond those authorized by the Militia Clauses), they were 
raised pursuant to the Army Power.369 
The Democratic-Republicans, in contrast, asserted that the 
proper dividing line was in the nature of the service. Militiamen served 
part-time, whereas regular soldiers served full-time. Representative 
Joseph McDowell claimed that “[h]e knew only of two descriptions of 
soldiers, regulars and militia”370 and “these men could not be considered 
any other than militia, until they were enlisted into the service of the 
United States.”371 
Other Democratic-Republicans took a more nuanced view of the 
situation. Representative Nathaniel Macon referred to the volunteers 
as a “mongrel kind of army” and challenged the Federalists to find the 
constitutional authority to create such a hybrid force.372 Albert Gallatin 
likewise thought that the proposed force straddled the line between 
army and militia. Several factors suggested classification as army. The 
men signed up voluntarily by enlistment, they had their officers 
appointed directly by the president, and, if summoned, they could be 
required to serve the full two years—whereas the 1792 and 1795 Militia 
Acts required militia to be rotated after serving three months on active 
 
 367. Id. at 1704, 1705, 1733.  
 368. Id. at 1705–06 (statement of Rep. Harper) (arguing that the volunteers were creating a 
contract with the United States to serve in the army and follow its regulations). 
 369. Id. at 1705–06, 1730, 1765. 
 370. Id. at 1737. 
 371. Id. at 1705 (statement of Rep. McDowell). 
 372. Id. at 1756 (statement of Rep. Macon). 
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duty.373 But like the militia, until called into actual service, volunteers 
remained as civilians with no army pay, and were subject neither to the 
rules governing the army nor the Articles of War.374 The problem for 
Gallatin was that the Constitution only recognized two categories of 
soldiers—“army” and “militia”—and these were halfway between both. 
Gallatin feared that, if allowed to proceed, Congress could evade the 
restrictions on the militia by turning the militia into a standing army.375 
Congress kept the provision for volunteers by a 56-37 vote.376 
The vote itself created some controversy, as at least one Democratic-
Republican claimed he had voted in favor of keeping the provision on 
the condition that Congress would subsequently amend it to comply 
with the Militia Officer Clause.377 But Congress refused to amend it, 
and the provision was adopted. Ultimately, while many volunteer 
companies offered themselves for service, only one was used to assist in 
suppressing Fries’s Rebellion.378 
On the merits, the Democratic-Republicans had the better 
argument. Neither proposed line offered by the Federalists to 
distinguish army troops from militia had any sound historical basis. 
Representative Sitgreaves’s army/militia distinction fails for the same 
reason that the present-day National Guard system has constitutional 
difficulties: it confuses limitations with constitutive conditions.379 Nor 
does the Dana-Harper-Otis conscription/volunteer line properly 
demarcate the army/militia distinction. This line belied a history of 
impressment and attempted conscription. When Britain needed to fill 
army quotas to fight in foreign wars, the Crown occasionally issued 
commissions of array authorizing impressment.380 Moreover, 
Parliament had proposed conscription bills in 1704 and 1707,381 George 
Washington requested a draft during the Revolution,382 and Madison 
 
 373. Id. at 1725–26 (statement of Rep. Gallatin). 
 374. Id. at 1725. 
 375. See id. at 1726 (“If the principle proposed to be adopted in this section be admitted, the 
consequence may be that all the regulations provided in the Constitution for securing a good militia 
may be evaded, and the whole of the militia be turned into a kind of Public Standing Army.”). 
 376. Id. at 1758. 
 377. See id. at 1759–60 (statement of Rep. McDowell) (arguing that further consideration of 
the volunteer provision was necessary to address whether or not the president should appoint the 
officers commanding the volunteers). 
 378. 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 250 n.102. 
 379. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between limitations 
and constitutive conditions). 
 380. See supra notes 339–344 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
 382. See Letter from George Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army, in 10 
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 42, at 362, 366. 
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proposed conscription during the War of 1812.383 Parliament’s and 
Madison’s bills were attacked as being unconstitutional, and in 
Section III.A, I argued that conscription into the regular army presents 
a structural constitutional problem. The Dana-Harper-Otis argument, 
however, is conceptual. They claimed that an “army” consists of 
“voluntarily enlisted soldiers” by definition. But this is wrong. Although 
voluntary enlistment was the customary way of raising soldiers, 
England and the United States knew of other ways, even if those ways 
were viewed as being illegitimate or illegal. Conscription does not 
convert an “army” into a “militia.”384 
Conversely, both England and the United States long had 
volunteer militia units. “Trained bands” began appearing in England in 
the sixteenth century.385 Volunteer militia also appeared in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and were widely known by the 
Framers.386 Pennsylvania initially only used volunteers for the militia 
because the colony had a large population of Quakers.387 Thus, the 
Dana-Harper-Otis argument is wrong on both counts: not only did 
“armies” sometimes have soldiers forced to serve, but militia units 
frequently had volunteers. 
As understood at the Framing, what distinguished armies from 
the militia was that armies had full-time troops while the militia had 
part-time troops. Consequently, the Democratic-Republicans were right 
to object to the proposed volunteer force as sanctioning an 
unconstitutional federal select militia.388  
 
 383. See supra notes 290, 312 and accompanying text. 
 384. And if a militia were, by definition, a conscripted land force, then that would be fatal for 
the constitutionality of conscription into the U.S. Army. 
 385. See BARNETT, supra note 29, at 34; MALCOLM, supra note 34, at 4. 
 386. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 160, at 2; CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 2 
(describing that the American colonies generally relied on volunteers while leaving the general 
militia “exempt from the militia call except under the most dire circumstances”); James Biser 
Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 947, 955 (1992) 
(“Volunteers were formed in militia units who came under the command of professional, usually 
British, officers and served in regular military units.”); see also WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 8 
(same). 
 387. See WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 7–8. 
 388. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D at 274–75 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham 
Small 1803): 
As these select corps were not called into actual service by those acts, but were only 
liable to be called upon at the pleasure of the president, it seems impossible to view 
them in any other light, than as a part of the militia of the states, separated by an 
unconstitutional act of congress, from the rest, for the purpose of giving to the president 
powers, which the constitution expressly denied him, and an influence the most 
dangerous that can be conceived, to the peace, liberty, and happiness of the United 
States. 
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That the House of Representatives, in a largely partisan action, 
approved volunteer army units in the heat of an undeclared war with 
France should not serve to liquidate the meaning of this constitutional 
provision.389 As with the Sedition Act,390 which was passed a few weeks 
later, Congress’s actions were highly partisan, with the Federalists in 
favor of the constitutionality of the volunteers and the Democratic-
Republicans opposed. The Federalists were frustrated with the 
Democratic-Republicans’ refusal to provide for any meaningful defense, 
whether by army, navy, or a properly disciplined militia.391 And the 
quasi-war with France exacerbated this frustration since they felt that 
the United States was vulnerable to invasion.392 So the Federalists were 
especially motivated to resolve constitutional questions in favor of 
federal power.393 
Nor did any settled practice emerge; later Congresses reversed 
themselves several times on whether the volunteers were part of the 
army or militia. In 1807, Congress passed legislation again authorizing 
volunteers, but this time the Democratic-Republicans, who now 
controlled Congress, required state appointment of officers.394 Because 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution requires federal appointment of 
federal officers, this action was only proper if the volunteers were 
militia, not army.395 But during the War of 1812, Madison requested—
and Congress granted—authority for the president to again appoint the 
officers, an action only proper if the volunteers were part of the army.396 
 
 389. On James Madison’s theory of constitutional liquidation, see William Baude, 
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). Madison argued that an indeterminate 
constitutional provision could become liquidated through a course of practice that was deliberate 
when that course of practice resulted in a meaning of the provision that was accepted by the public 
and acquiesced to by those holding dissenting views. See id. at 13–21.  
 390. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 391. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1732 (Joseph Gales ed., 1851) (1798) (statement of Rep. 
Sitgreaves) (expressing frustration with the Democratic-Republicans’ “[un]willing[ness] to pay for 
a navy, nor an army, nor to trust the defence of the country to its own citizens”). 
 392. Id. at 1734–35 (statement of Rep. Otis). 
 393. On the other hand, the Federalists did not dispense with all constitutional niceties. A bill 
authorizing the president to “call[ ] out 20,000 militia, at a time to be trained and disciplined” was 
defeated with only eleven votes in favor of it. Id. at 1701–02. Members referred to the Militia 
Clauses, which explicitly reserved training to the states. Id. 
 394. An Act Authorizing the President of the United States to Accept the Service of a Number 
of Volunteer Companies, Not Exceeding Thirty Thousand Men, ch. 15, § 2 Stat. 419, 419–20 (1807). 
Strangely, given the Democratic-Republicans’ constitutional objections, the Act grandfathered in 
companies whose officers were appointed by the president. Moreover, the Act failed to limit the 
federalization of the volunteers to only those purposes allowed by the Militia Clauses, although 
the House sponsor provided assurances that the volunteers would only be used in case of 
insurrection or invasion. See 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 167–72.  
 395. 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 167. 
 396. An Act Supplementary to the Act Entitled “An Act Authorizing the President of the 
United States to Accept and Organize Certain Volunteer Military Corps,” ch. 138, 2 Stat. 785 
(1812). James Madison’s support for federal appointment of officers might give credence to the 
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And during the Civil War, in a law reminiscent of Madison’s failed 
militia proposal,397 Congress authorized the president to commission 
generals in the volunteers, while leaving to the states the appointment 
of field, staff, and company officers.398 The services provided by the Civil 
War volunteers, moreover, were primarily militia in character—“for the 
purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, enforcing the 
laws, and preserving and protecting public property.”399 Thus, it is 
difficult to draw any conclusions from the congressional precedent, 
except to say that Congress, as an institution, had been undecided on 
this question and had often faced the issue during difficult wartime 
circumstances.400 
Nevertheless, Congress’s struggle to separate “militia” and 
“army” leaves no doubt about the illegitimacy of conscription for the 
reserves. The Federalists, in arguing for the legitimacy of the 
“volunteers,” argued that the difference between a militiaman and an 
army soldier was that the militiaman was a conscript while the soldier 
was a volunteer.401 The Democratic-Republicans countered (correctly, I 
believe) that the distinction between the two forces was whether they 
were part-time (militia) or full-time (army).402 Regardless of which side 
was correct, it is clear that conscription in the army reserve would not 
be allowed. Either their conscription or their part-time status would 
make conscripted reservists members of the “militia.”403 
 
view that the volunteers were army. But one must remember that Madison was highly partisan 
on this issue. Although a Democratic-Republican in 1812, Madison had been a staunch opponent 
of any state control over the army or militia since his days as a delegate at the Constitutional 
Convention. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 398. An Act to Authorize the Employment of Volunteers to Aid in Enforcing the Laws and 
Protecting Public Property, ch. 9, 12 Stat. 268 (1861). The law allowed the president to commission 
lower-ranking officers if states failed to make the appointment. § 4, 12 Stat. at 269. My thanks to 
Zachary Price for pointing this out. 
 399. § 1, 12 Stat. at 268. 
 400. During the Civil War, courts drew different dividing lines between armies and militia. 
The Indiana Supreme Court accepted the voluntary enlistment/conscription line. See Kerr v. 
Jones, 19 Ind. 351, 354 (1862) (“The army is raised by voluntary enlistments. The militia is called 
forth.”). The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals used the full-time/part-time distinction when 
deciding the legality of conscription under the Confederate Constitution. See Burroughs v. Peyton, 
57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 470, 475 (1864) (“An army is a body of men whose business is war: the militia a 
body of men composed of citizens occupied ordinarily in the pursuits of civil life, but organized for 
discipline and drill, and called into . . . temporary military service when the exigencies of the 
country require it.” (emphasis added)). 
 401. See supra note 368 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra notes 370–375 and accompanying text. 
 403. The creation of the provisional army does raise another question of whether Congress can 
maintain an “inactive reserve.” The inactive reserve is basically a pool of individuals who give the 
government an option contract—that is, they agree, if called, to enter full-time army service. I 
cannot fully answer that question here, but my inclination would be that such an inactive reserve 
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Accepting arguendo the legitimacy of the draft into the regular 
army, the Supreme Court would have good reasons to hold the line 
there. Recognizing the power to draft into the (regular) national army—
while in tension with the limitations of the Militia Clauses—does not 
result in their total annihilation. Individuals and state governments 
would only lose their protections and reserved powers under the Militia 
Clauses when citizens were drafted into the professional forces. But if 
the federal government can have a conscripted “U.S. Army Reserve”—
a militia in everything but name—the federal government has little 
reason to share control over the militia with the states. The federal 
government can just raise the same part-time forces using its Army 
Power without the inconvenience of the Militia Clauses’ limitations. 
Moreover, recognizing the power to draft only into the regular 
army maintains soft-power limitations on the federal government’s 
ability to conscript outside the militia system. With a draft, the federal 
government is still bound to pay for regular troops. The cost of troops 
naturally serves to limit the size of the regular army and 
correspondingly diminishes Congress’s enthusiasm for a universal 
draft, especially in peacetime. Thus, even conceding the legitimacy of 
the draft, Congress should be limited to conscripting soldiers into the 
regular army. 
 
*        *        * 
 
This Part has defended two claims. First, though it is a close and 
difficult question as an originalist matter, conscription into the national 
army is unconstitutional. Second, assuming the constitutionality of 
conscription, the federal government is limited to conscripting soldiers 
into the regular army. The abrogation of traditional limitations on 
federal military power have had a profound and continuing impact on 
the balance of military power between the president and Congress, 
between the federal government and the states, and between the 
federal government and the citizenry—issues to which I now turn. 
IV. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES:  
WHY MILITARY FEDERALISM STILL MATTERS 
This Part explains how the destruction of federalism-based 
checks on federal military power affects contemporary constitutional 
and political debates. Granting the federal government virtual plenary 
 
would be constitutional provided that (1) the individuals entered full-time army service if called 
and (2) the government did not regulate the individuals until they were called to serve. 
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authority over the military has helped with military readiness and 
political accountability. But the arrogation of power solely in the federal 
government presents new constitutional challenges. This Part will 
consider the effects of the demise of military federalism on  
(1) separation of powers, (2) the federal-state balance, and  
(3) Congress’s power to impose military law on reserve and retired 
soldiers.   
A. Separation of Powers 
One fiercely contested topic is the proper demarcation in 
responsibility between Congress and the president in authorizing and 
levying armed conflict. Since President Truman’s unilateral 
commitment of troops to Korea, presidents have asserted increasingly 
strong preclusive authority to deploy military forces irrespective of 
Congress’s inaction or contrary action.404 
Some commentators argue that, except in cases of immediate 
self-defense, Congress is supposed to authorize war before the president 
can commit troops.405 Others argue that the appropriations and 
impeachment powers give Congress the ability to check executive 
warmaking, but the president requires no advance congressional 
approval before committing troops.406 This second position generally 
implies a broad inherent preclusive power of the president as 
commander in chief to commit troops and authoritatively determine the 
incidents of combat. And a third group does not take a sequential 
 
 404. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1057–58 (2008). Barron and Lederman 
trace the history and note that presidents before Truman rarely defied Congress openly. Id. at 
1055–56. Mostly, they acted in the absence of Congress or, when they defied Congress, did so under 
the theory that an emergency existed and Congress would later ratify their actions. Id. The concept 
of a true preclusive authority to engage in hostilities in open defiance of Congress began with 
President Truman and continues to the present day. Id. at 1098–99.  
 405. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 5 (1993) (explaining that Congress was granted the power “to 
declare war” rather than “to make war” so as to ensure the president possessed tactical control 
over military forces and retained the ability to “repel sudden attacks” when necessary); Charles A. 
Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 675 
(1972) (explaining that while an early draft of the Constitution granted Congress the power to 
“make” war, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry supported replacing this text with the power 
“declare” war, leaving the executive the power to repel sudden attacks); William Van Alstyne, 
Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 6 (1972) (recounting discourse during the Constitutional Convention on the change). 
 406. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 295 (1996) (“Contrary to the arguments by 
today’s scholars, the Declare War Clause does not add to Congress’ store of war powers at the 
expense of the President. Rather, the Clause gives Congress a judicial role in declaring that a state 
of war exists between the United States and another nation . . . .”). 
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position, but argues for a strong role of Congress throughout the 
warmaking process and against an inherent preclusive power in the 
president.407 
As John Yoo has recognized, this debate creates a role reversal 
in constitutional scholars’ politics and theories of constitutional 
interpretation.408 Liberals often marshal original constitutional debates 
to support their belief against executive power to initiate war. 
Conservatives, in contrast, focus on the evolving times, from the prior 
precedents of presidents unilaterally commencing wars to arguments 
that, in the nuclear age, the president must have significant authority 
to act without Congress’s approval.409 Neither camp is monolithic. Yoo’s 
article, for example, gives a comprehensive originalist defense for why 
the president enjoys significant inherent constitutional authority to 
initiate hostilities.410 
The destruction of military federalism offers a different kind of 
reply to originalist scholars who argue that the president enjoys 
significant inherent constitutional authority to initiate war. Military 
federalism provided many hard-power and soft-power checks on the 
president’s ability to engage U.S. forces unilaterally, especially in 
foreign theaters of conflict.411 With respect to formal constitutional 
checks, the federal government had limited access to the militia, which 
was the nation’s intended military reserve force. The militia could only 
be used to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. 
The Constitution, moreover, grants Congress—not the president—the 
power to provide for calling out the militia for these purposes. Congress 
could exercise the power directly, as it did before 1792 when Congress 
examined President Washington’s request for forces on an individual-
conflict basis.412 Or Congress could largely delegate this power to the 
president, as it did with the 1792 and 1795 Militia Acts and the 1807 
Insurrection Act. But even when the power was delegated, the president 
was limited to calling on reserve military forces only for domestic law 
 
 407. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) 
(arguing that Congress remains intimately involved with the warmaking process, even if the 
executive takes the lead on initiating hostilities); cf. Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander 
in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2008) 
(examining the role of Congress during hostilities and arguing that Congress has significant 
concurrent power over operations). 
 408. Yoo, supra note 406, at 172.  
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. at 172–75. 
 411. My thanks to Alex Platt for making this point to me in private discussions. 
 412. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 406, at 291 (explaining that Congress debated the merits of 
various campaigns when President Washington requested more troops and militia). 
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enforcement, to suppress an insurrection, or to repel an invasion. Thus, 
the president only possessed unilateral control over a small standing 
army and navy. These forces were insufficient to allow the president to 
unilaterally engage in significant foreign conflicts. 
The dramatic increase in today’s standing army and navy gives 
the president a greater capacity to engage in foreign conflicts. As of 
February 2020, the United States has approximately 1.38 million active 
duty personnel.413 These forces allow the president to unilaterally 
engage in limited conflicts, such as those in Panama and Kosovo. But 
the true backbone of today’s armed forces—what allows the president 
to sustain long foreign campaigns or engage unilaterally in total war 
with another country—is the U.S. Armed Forces Reserve. The United 
States maintains an additional 804,235 in the Selected Reserves (i.e., 
the active, drilling component).414 Of these, approximately 524,000 
reservists are in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard, and 
another approximately 147,000 are in the U.S. Air Force Reserve and 
the Air National Guard.415 As I have argued in Part II, these forces are 
constitutionally part of the “militia.” This means that today’s large 
standing army, comprising regular troops, has not obviated the federal 
government’s need to maintain a large organized militia. 
By organizing the militia outside of its intended constitutional 
limits, the federal government has destroyed many soft-power checks 
 
 413. For active duty and reserve numbers, see DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & 
Publications, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp 
(last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KT5C-RF9E] (compiling statistics). The manpower 
statistics cited are from the February 29, 2020 version of the Department of Defense reports. See 
Armed Forces Strength Figures for February 29, 2020, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Feb. 29, 2020), 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=ms0_2002.pdf&groupName=milTop 
[https://perma.cc/ABN4-Q3VL]; Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade, DEF. MANPOWER 
DATA CTR. (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName= 
rg2002.pdf&groupName=milRankGrade [https://perma.cc/E4MC-WPJR]. The figure includes the 
total manpower of all Armed Forces components, including the Coast Guard. For the maximum 
authorized strength for active duty, permanent active force, and Selected Reserves, see John S. 
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, §§ 401, 411, 
412, 132 Stat. 1636, 1734–1736.  
 414. Selected Reserves by Rank/Grade, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Feb. 29, 2020), 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=DRS_42486_SelRes_202002.pdf&gr
oupName=resRankGrade [https://perma.cc/X2KM-MQFR].   
 415. See id. Again, these numbers include only the Selected Reserve. For more severe 
emergencies, the federal government may call upon an additional 231,000 members of the 
Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard. Lawrence Kapp, Defense Primer: 
Reserve Forces, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10540.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46MM-2TDG] (statistics as of September 30, 2019). And if the federal 
government needs even more manpower, the United States may call up members of the Standby 
Reserve, 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (2012), as well as retirees from the active duty and reserve components, 
10 U.S.C. § 688 (2012). See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 4-05, 
JOINT MOBILIZATION PLANNING IV-7 (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ 
Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9PV-XNF8].   
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on the president’s capacity to wage war unilaterally. Under the 
Constitution as originally understood, the president would have a 
difficult time initiating a foreign war. Because the militia was only 
available for domestic needs, waging a foreign war of any substance 
required the president to request from Congress an increase in the 
authorized strength of the professional services. Thus, the original 
constitutional system forced early presidential-congressional 
consultation. Today, in contrast, the president can call up substantial 
reserves without first consulting Congress about the need for more 
personnel.416 And even if the president managed to convince Congress, 
he still would have to convince the potential future troops themselves. 
The accepted mode of raising regular troops was by enlistment—not 
conscription—so the federal government would have to entice sufficient 
soldiers to enlist for the war. Unpopular wars would likely command 
higher enlistment bounties, which would serve as an economic 
disincentive to initiate conflicts. 
One might argue, as David Barron and Martin Lederman do, 
that extensive presidential-congressional consultations still take 
place.417 Although the president might be able to call up the reserves 
and initiate a conflict, he could not sustain the conflict without 
congressional support. The need for increased appropriations to fight a 
war inevitably leads the president to coordinate with Congress. Indeed, 
for some like Yoo, the Appropriations Power is the core of Congress’s 
check on the president’s ability to wage war.418 Yoo argues that 
a failure of political will should not be confused with a constitutional defect. A 
congressional decision not to exercise its constitutional prerogatives does not translate 
into an executive branch violation of the Constitution. Certainly congressional timidity 
cannot justify rearranging the Constitution—either to restrict the President’s war-
making powers, or to push the federal courts into political question cases—without a 
constitutional amendment.419 
But as a matter of political reality, relying solely on the 
Appropriations Power shifts the balance of power heavily toward the 
executive. Because the president would have to convince Congress to 
 
 416. 10 U.S.C. § 12302 (2012) (Ready Reserve). The president, however, generally needs a 
congressional declaration of war or national emergency to call up members of the Standby and 
Retired Reserve. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a). 
 417. See supra notes 404, 407, and accompanying text. 
 418. See Yoo, supra note 406, at 295 (“Although the Constitution gives the President the 
initiative in war by virtue of his powers over foreign relations and the military, it also forces the 
President to seek money and support from Congress at every turn.”). Of course, another soft-power 
limitation on the federal government’s ability to wage war was the limited taxing power of the 
original Constitution. Initiating war often required Congress to authorize borrowing. Today, in 
contrast, expanded revenue sources allow the president to initiate conflicts and only later go back 
to Congress to continue the funding. My thanks to Ian Ayres for raising this taxation point. 
 419. Id. at 299. 
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raise the necessary troops, the original constitutional system required 
close consultation before the president could initiate significant 
hostilities. Now, the system only requires consultation to continue 
combat that the executive can unilaterally start. Politically, the 
president has an easier time requesting extra funds when American 
troops are already fighting in harm’s way than he does convincing 
Congress to raise the necessary troops to begin the conflict.420 Thus, Yoo 
does not account for the fact that “congressional timidity” is an 
unintended byproduct of destroying constitutional limits on federal 
military power.421 The destruction of military federalism is likely a 
substantial factor in Congress’s abdication of its role to deliberate and 
authorize wars. 
Because the destruction of federalism in military affairs has 
altered the separation-of-powers dynamic between Congress and the 
president, evaluating the constitutionality of congressional efforts to 
rebalance that power inherently involves “second-best” constitutional 
interpretation. For example, assume arguendo that the War Powers Act 
is unconstitutional as an original matter. This does not tell us whether 
we should recalibrate the system because the destruction of military 
federalism has given the president more power to initiate war than the 
Constitution originally intended. In this light, we might view the Act as 
a necessary legal restraint on the president’s enhanced warmaking 
ability. Given that the federal government is already operating outside 
of its intended constitutional limits in military affairs, the real question 
we should be asking is: How do we redivide the military power that the 
federal government seized from the states among the legislative and 
executive branches? For originalists, these questions involve answering 
whether second-best doctrines should be employed to compensate for 
the failure to follow the original structure. 
The destruction of military federalism also means that state 
political leaders have less influence on the president’s use of military 
reserves. As Jessica Bulman-Pozen has explained, cooperative 
federalism causes the states to act as a check on broad executive 
discretion.422 Under the constitutional militia system, state political 
leaders, to whom the militia were principally attached, could be 
 
 420. See, e.g., id. at 298 (noting, in the context of the war in Bosnia, that “the House passed a 
resolution opposing President Clinton’s policy, but supporting the troops”). 
 421. Id. at 298–99. 
 422. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 491 (2012) (“[B]y giving two different actors some role in a statutory 
scheme . . . Congress bakes competition into the scheme. Each agent has the incentive and ability 
to monitor the other, and, when they disagree, to claim that it is the superior agent of Congress.”).  
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expected to advocate on the militia’s behalf.423 The political dialogue 
involved in calling forth the militia—and the militia’s resistance to such 
inconvenience except when necessary for defense of the country—would 
serve to curb the president’s ability to employ military force without 
popular support. Except when in active service, militia leaders would 
not be under the president’s chain of command, which would insulate 
them if they provided candid commentary about the burdens of national 
deployment. When the president exceeded his authority or abused his 
discretion, state leaders could appeal to Congress to curb that discretion 
since Congress had ultimate control over calling forth the militia. The 
original constitutional system diffused executive power over the 
military between the president and the states, and that division 
reinforced Congress’s primacy in military affairs.  
Military federalism thus placed significant hard- and soft-power 
safeguards against the exercise of the president’s Commander-in-Chief 
Power. The destruction of military federalism has created a power 
vacuum, which has largely been filled by expanding unilateral 
presidential authority. Future debates over the proper demarcation of 
warmaking authority between Congress and the president must 
account for the changed federal-state balance in military affairs.   
B. Federalism 
The destruction of military federalism has had some salutary 
effects. While the breakdown in military federalism has contributed to 
Congress’s decline in deliberating and authorizing military conflicts, 
limiting state power over the militia has enhanced Congress’s role in 
supervising the readiness of the armed forces and militia. Madison’s 
desire for fully nationalized armed forces has been realized. For the 
military, the result has been largely positive: better prepared and 
equipped armed forces and the prevention of dangerous inefficiencies in 
the constitutional military regime. 
Nevertheless, the destruction of military federalism has had 
profound implications for the federal-state balance of power. States now 
have little power over military affairs, including over their state’s 
 
 423. This is not to say that state governments would have a veto—only that state officers would 
lobby in favor of the militia if the burdens placed on the militia were too great. As Madison noted 
during the Virginia ratifying convention, “[i]f you put it in the power of the State Governments to 
refuse the militia, by requiring their consent, you destroy the General Government, and sacrifice 
particular States.” Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1272, 
1274; see also Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 354–55 (1990) (rejecting the constitutional 
necessity of a training veto for National Guardsmen sent abroad); cf. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 19, 28 (1827) (holding that the president has sole and unreviewable authority to determine 
the exigency when calling forth the militia pursuant to an act of Congress). 
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militia. In times of war, this creates difficult problems for state leaders 
because they often lack access to military forces sometimes necessary 
to meet domestic needs. The militia’s hybrid federal-state status 
provides a great case study of many contemporary federalism disputes. 
1. Political Accountability 
One major theme undergirding the rise of contemporary judicial 
federalism is the need to ensure political accountability.424 In United 
States v. Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that “citizens must have some 
means of knowing which of the two governments to hold accountable for 
the failure to perform a given function.”425 Without knowing which 
leaders to hold responsible, citizens might hold neither accountable, 
thereby leading to a failure of political responsibility. Likewise, the 
Supreme Court in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States 
justified the anticommandeering principle of state legislatures and 
executive officers on the grounds that Congress could insulate itself 
from unpopular political choices by forcing the states to shoulder 
them.426 
The history of the militia system lends credence to Justice 
Kennedy’s political accountability argument. The Militia Act of 1792 
provided guidance on organizing and arming the militia. But Congress 
left many of the controversial details—such as compulsory training—to 
the states because Congress could not reach agreement on these 
issues.427 Despite repeated exhortations from federal political leaders to 
correct the problem, neither federal nor state governments took 
ownership.428 And a substantial reason why is that neither the federal 
government nor the states wanted to pay for the militia. The 1792 
Militia Act did not appropriate any money for the militia; Congress 
refused to spend the $400,000 necessary to train and equip it.429 Since 
 
 424. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten 
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 360 (2003) (“If one sovereign is permitted to obscure its role in 
bringing about undesirable regulatory outcomes, or if political responsibility is otherwise veiled to 
such an extent that the people cannot accurately allocate blame and praise between the two 
governments, then the competition’s chief purpose has been thwarted.”). 
 425. 514 U.S. 549, 576–77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 426. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (state and local officers); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (state legislatures). 
 427. See H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, 
OR HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 113 (2002) (“Congress simply laid out the 
organizational form of the nation’s militia, dividing the force into divisions and battalions that 
were in turn subdivided into regiments and companies . . . and left to the states the problem of 
compelling citizens to fill out these units.”). 
 428. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 170; UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 427, at 115 & 
n.29. 
 429. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 6. 
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the federal government maintained a small army, the Act effectively 
left the states funding national defense. An 1803 congressional act 
required the states to provide militiamen with weapons, ammunition, 
and equipment.430 But Congress provided no funding, so the states 
largely ignored this mandate.431 The original militia structure thus 
permitted the federal government to divorce the laudable goal (i.e., 
maintaining a militia over a standing army) from the politically 
unpopular necessary incidents (i.e., paying for the militia and 
compelling citizens to train), which led to dysfunction. 
The situation only improved after the federal government 
effectively took control of the militia from the states with the Dick Act. 
Congress conditioned the receipt of federal funds on the National 
Guard’s compliance with federal standards. The Dick Act required 
National Guard units to attend twenty-four drills per year and to meet 
the standards of the regular army, in addition to subjecting National 
Guard units to inspections by regular army officers.432 As the federal 
government became the near-exclusive source of funds and equipment 
for the organized militia, the federal government concomitantly 
assumed control over the militia’s supervision.   
Today, responsibility for the National Guard’s mission falls 
largely with the president and federal leaders. The public recognizes 
this fact.433 And while not in keeping with original constitutional 
design, centralization of power has laudably created political 
accountability—federal leaders know that they are now responsible for 
the military’s functioning. As a result, the National Guard is better 
trained and equipped than the nineteenth-century militia.   
2. Overseas Deployment and Domestic Security 
While transferring military authority entirely to the federal 
government has had beneficial effects on military readiness, the 
destruction of military federalism has had some negative consequences 
on the federal-state balance. The greatest disadvantage is the 
unavailability of state forces during foreign wars. 
 
 430. An Act in Addition to an Act, Entitled “An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National 
Defense, by Establishing an Uniform Militia Throughout the United States,” ch. 15, § 2, 2 Stat. 
207, 207 (1803). 
 431. See 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 7 n.26. 
 432. Militia Act of 1903 (Dick Act), ch. 196, § 18, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). 
 433. Following Hurricane Katrina, for example, President George W. Bush—not state political 
leaders—took the brunt of the blame for the inadequate response to the disaster. See Eric Lipton, 
Republicans’ Report on Katrina Assails Administration Response, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/13/politics/13katrina.html [https://perma.cc/JP2E-CXTK]. 
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The Constitution authorizes the federal government to 
federalize the militia only to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, 
and repel invasions. Outside these circumstances, the militia remains 
under the command of the states. The delegates steadfastly refused 
Madison’s attempts to nationalize the militia entirely. A number of 
reasons were given for allowing the states to retain some control. Some 
feared that having no available military force would doom the states to 
insignificance and obliterate the states’ limited sovereignty.434 Others 
gave practical arguments: states sometimes needed military forces to 
enforce their laws, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions before 
federal authority could be summoned.435 
In recent times, states frequently have found their organized 
militia called into foreign wars under the Army Power. Many National 
Guardsmen have performed at least one tour of duty in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. These foreign deployments can interfere with the 
National Guard’s ability to perform state functions back home.436 The 
potential for National Guard deployments has caused many states to 
maintain their own military organizations, called “state guards” or 
“state defense forces.”437 These state organizations sit outside the 
national militia system, but Congress has consented to their 
existence.438 
State defense forces have a murkier status than the militia. 
Many states consider state guards or state defense forces to be part of 
their organized militia.439 Federal law, however, does not recognize 
them as such.440 The federal government, moreover, does not provide 
for their organization, arming, or discipline. And state defense forces 
may not be “called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.”441 
 
 434. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 435. See supra notes 73, 93 and accompanying text.  
 436. See, e.g., 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1) (2012) (relieving National Guard members called to active 
duty in the “National Guard of the United States” from their state militia duties). 
 437. See Arthur N. Tulak, Robert W. Kraft & Don Silbaugh, State Defense Forces and 
Homeland Security, 33 PARAMETERS 132, 132 (2003–2004), https://sgaus.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/10/State-Defense-Force-and-Homeland-Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4SG-8FMV]. 
 438. See 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (authorizing such forces). 
 439. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-3 (2020) (stating that the organized militia of the state 
includes the state guard); ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.030 (2020) (same); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 120 
(West 2020) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 121-1, 122A-2 (2018) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2-2, 
20-5-1 (2019) (same); N.Y MIL. LAW § 44 (McKinney 2020) (same). 
 440. See 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1) (2012). Federal law may nevertheless imply their existence as 
organized militias. See, e.g., 32 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2012) (defining “Army National Guard” as a subset 
of the state’s organized militia). But see 10 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (defining “organized militia” to 
include only the National Guard and naval militia). 
 441. 32 U.S.C. § 109(c). Additionally, state defense force members may not be members of any 
U.S. Armed Forces reserve component. 32 U.S.C. § 109(e). Although state defense forces may not 
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Whether this last provision bans their federalization entirely, including 
for the purposes of the Militia Clauses, or simply prohibits their 
conscription into the federal professional services (i.e., in the same 
manner that National Guardsmen are part of the federal army reserve) 
remains an open question.442 In dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that state defense forces might be subject to federal militia duty 
pursuant to the federal government’s statutory power to call forth the 
entire militia, including the unorganized militia.443 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has relied on the 
existence of state defense forces to justify the federal government’s 
domination of the National Guard system. Because federal law 
authorizes states to have defense forces, the Court concluded that the 
ability of the federal government to call forth a state’s entire National 
Guard for any reason (in their status as Army Reservists) is not 
constitutionally problematic.444 The Court stated, “As long as that 
provision remains in effect, there is no basis for an argument that the 
federal statutory scheme deprives Minnesota of any constitutional 
entitlement to a separate militia of its own.”445   
The courts have never answered what entitlement states have, 
if any, to maintain organized militia units independent of federal 
authority. Before Heller, lower courts frequently held in gun control 
cases that the Second Amendment guaranteed state governments the 
right to maintain a militia.446 But in military law cases such as Perpich 
and the Selective Draft Law Cases, federal courts steadfastly disclaimed 
any preclusive authority of the state to maintain a militia.447 At most, 
it seems that a state has a concurrent power to organize additional 
militia units based on the Tenth Amendment but no preclusive 
power.448 
 
be drafted into the armed forces, state defense force members are not exempt from federal military 
duty in their individual capacities. 32 U.S.C. § 109(d). 
 442. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 352 n.25 (1990). 
 443. See id. 
 444. Id. at 350–54. 
 445. Id. at 352.  
 446. See, e.g., Silveria v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 622, 628 (2008), that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals, 
including those not presently enrolled in a state-organized militia, to possess handguns in their 
homes for private self-defense.  
 447. See, e.g., Heath, supra note 95, at 54, 61–64. Although it is sometimes said that a state 
has a right to have a militia, the federal government can conscript every able-bodied person. So 
even if states theoretically have a right to have a militia, this right is vacuous because the states 
have no preclusive power to have able-bodied persons available for militia service. 
 448. See discussion supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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Regardless of what constitutional entitlement states have to 
their own militia units, states lack the money, training, leadership, and 
political will to organize these forces.449 Consequently, these state 
defense forces are largely unable to replace the National Guard in 
providing for domestic security. If anything, the current state of these 
forces demonstrates why the Framers were wise not to leave the militia 
entirely in state hands. 
The Framers intended the militia to be a cooperative federal 
institution. Now, two parallel militia systems have developed, one 
cooperative and one involving dual federalism. The federal government 
uses federal funding conditions to dominate the National Guard and 
control it beyond intended constitutional limits. If states want to escape 
the Guard system, they must develop state defense forces, which are 
largely kept outside of the national military structure. But the Framers 
largely disavowed dual federalism in military affairs; the Constitution 
intended a uniform militia serving as the backbone of national defense. 
The federal government had a large role in providing for the militia’s 
organization and training. When the Guard is available—which it 
generally is—the states have access to well-trained militia units. But 
during prolonged wars or deployments, states risk losing access to 
competent military forces to perform state functions. 
3. Preventing Illegal State Resistance to Federal Authority 
By design, the original constitutional framework provided the 
states with the ability to resist federal authority. Madison explained in 
Federalist No. 46 that, in the event of a tyrannical exercise of federal 
power, the states could band together outside of the federal framework 
and resist.450 Hamilton made a similar claim in Federalist No. 28.451 
The Constitution facilitated this by reserving substantial authority over 
the militia to state governments, including by allowing state 
governments to appoint militia officers and by securing to the people 
the right to bear arms. 
 
 449. See, e.g., James Jay Carafano & Jessica Zuckerman, The 21st-Century Militia: State 
Defense Forces and Homeland Security, HERITAGE FOUND. 6–8 (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2474.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6XQ-P36A] 
(surveying extant state defense forces and finding them underfunded, with few personnel, and not 
much public awareness of their existence or mission).  
 450. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 297–98 (James Madison) (“But ambitious 
encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not 
excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general 
alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause.”). 
 451. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 24, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he State 
governments will . . . afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the 
national authority.”). 
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There is little doubt that the states often abused their 
reservation of military power. During the War of 1812, many states 
refused to place their militia under federal command and interfered 
with the president’s role as commander in chief.452 Obstructing federal 
authority made the militia inadequate for national defense. Even more 
prominently, the Southern states unleashed their military power 
directly against the federal government during the Civil War.453 
The consolidation of military power in the federal government 
has largely prevented such illegal state obstructions. State governors 
no longer possess the raw power to interfere with national military 
objectives, and the courts have supported the federal government when 
faced with state interference. The closest modern-day analogue to the 
state governor’s refusal of the militia during the War of 1812 was some 
governors’ refusals to allow the National Guard to go abroad for 
training. The governors objected that the federal government would use 
the Guardsmen to undermine foreign governments. In attempting to 
block the use of the National Guard, the governors placed their foreign 
policy preferences in conflict with the president’s.454 In Perpich v. 
Department of Defense, the Supreme Court held that state governors 
had no right to veto federal military policy by withholding Guard 
units.455 
Nor can states effectively combat the federal government 
directly. When Governor Orval Faubus used the National Guard to 
prevent school integration, President Eisenhower federalized them and 
ordered them to report to their armories.456 Because the National 
Guard’s allegiance lays primarily with the federal government, 
President Eisenhower had no difficulty removing the National Guard 
from state command. This gave Governor Faubus no organized military 
power at his disposal to resist lawful federal authority. 
Commentators often emphasize only the fact that the partial 
reservation of the militia to the states enabled the militia to resist the 
federal government.457 While the Framers partially designed the militia 
 
 452. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 453. Weigley, supra note 35, at 222 (“[T]he Civil War would demonstrate that with their militia 
systems, the states retained sufficient sovereignty in a military sense to wage a large-scale war 
against the federal government.”). 
 454. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 455. 496 U.S. 334 (1990). 
 456. Jack Raymond, Soldiers Fly In, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1957), 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1957/09/25/84766280.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6B2A-EYP5]. 
 457. Amar correctly points out this is not an insurrectionist theory. Instead, the reservation 
to the states and the people of the ability to resist the federal government was predicated on the 
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system to enable this, the checks on military power were reciprocal. The 
Constitution also vested the federal government with the power to 
overcome unlawful state resistance to federal authority. The demise of 
military federalism has eased the federal government’s ability to 
overcome illegal state resistance to federal law. 
4. The Militia as the Final Check on Federal Oppression 
As a corollary of the last point, the final way in which the 
destruction of military federalism matters for the federal-state balance 
is that the militia no longer serves as a meaningful check on the federal 
army’s use of unlawful force. This function is one of the most widely 
touted purposes of military federalism, since the Framing generation 
worried about the potential of standing armies to oppress the citizenry. 
In contemporary times, however, checking the federal army is likely 
military federalism’s least relevant purpose. 
Military federalism was largely a concession to moderates and 
Antifederalists during the Framing era. Many of the Federalists, 
including James Madison, lobbied for fully nationalized armed forces 
and militia, not trusting the states to handle defense matters 
adequately. For them, there was no need to check the army; separation 
of powers and elections provided adequate safeguards against 
tyrannical use of the military.458 Indeed, Madison labeled the 
Antifederalist argument that these safeguards could fail as 
“extravagant.”459 
But it is wrong to infer from this fact that having a militia 
system as a whole has no contemporary value. Although the militia 
system had a remedial purpose (to restore civilian control of 
government if political or military leaders failed to respect the rule of 
law), its main value was prophylactic: to prevent such a situation from 
developing in the first place.460 Today, the militia system retains much 
of its prophylactic value. The Supreme Court has long recognized that 
“the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian 
 
breakdown of ordinary legal institutions and the rule of law. See Amar, supra note 23, at 1499–
1500. 
 458. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 295 (James Madison). 
 459. Id. at 299. 
 460. See Amar, supra note 23, at 1500 (“[P]erhaps the strongest evidence of the effectiveness 
of the framers’ system of military checks is two centuries of civilian supremacy that have made a 
military coup almost unthinkable.”); Weigley, supra note 35, at 215–16 (“Through the early years 
of the Republic and throughout the nineteenth century, military forces were too small and too 
peripheral to American politics and society at large to be anything but compliant with civilian 
control, except possibly during the Civil War.”). 
Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:48 PM 
2020] FEDERALISM AND THE MILITARY POWER 1071 
society.”461 A major fear of the Framers was that regular soldiers, who 
live in a separate, highly regulated, and disciplined community, would 
not value the freedom that they were tasked with defending since they 
did not experience that freedom in their daily life. Whatever their label 
(e.g., “reserves” or “National Guard”), part-time citizen-soldiers provide 
a forum to keep the military directly connected with the civilian 
community. These individuals have nonmilitary occupations and, 
except when in actual service, live apart from military discipline. 
Nevertheless, they give the government a rapid way of expanding the 
nation’s military forces in an emergency, thereby diminishing the 
number of regular soldiers needed by the federal government. The 
primary purpose of the militia was never to combat the federal 
government. Since its earliest days in England, the militia provided 
cost-effective defense for the community. Today’s organized militia, 
whether called the “U.S. Army Reserve” or the “National Guard,” 
continues that tradition. 
That said, the destruction of state checks on federal military 
power remains significant. The abolition of the remedy of last resort 
places more emphasis on other methods of ensuring civilian control of 
the military. In a system that lacks state checks over federal power, it 
becomes more important to maintain balance in the federal system. 
This is done through respecting horizontal structure—that is, by 
maintaining separation of powers and having adequate checks and 
balances on the executive branch. And it is done by maintaining the 
professionalization of military personnel, including keeping the 
military politically neutral.462 
C. The Limits of Military Criminal Jurisdiction 
Because the federal government has collapsed the militia into 
the army, a final issue concerns Congress’s power to subject military 
reservists to military criminal jurisdiction. The Framers limited 
application of military law to the members of the militia only when they 
were “in actual service in time of War or public danger.”463 Otherwise, 
part-time citizen-soldiers received the same criminal procedure rights 
as other citizens. In contrast, the Constitution allows Congress to 
subject regular members of the armed forces to military law at all times 
 
 461. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). 
 462. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 43–64 
(2010) (describing the increasing politicization of the military); HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 
80–97 (discussing how military professionalism can reinforce civilian control). 
 463. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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based solely on their status as members of the armed forces.464 This 
includes cases when the crime has no service connection to the military 
other than its commission by a military member. This raises an 
important question: Are military reservists to be treated as “militia” or 
as professional military for the purposes of military criminal 
jurisdiction? 
Federal law presently adopts an in-between approach. By 
statute, Congress has restricted application of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) to reservists. Generally, reservists are not 
subject to military law unless they are on active duty or are training 
during inactive duty465—essentially a militia-type approach. But there 
are statutory exemptions. For example, the UCMJ applies to retired 
regular personnel receiving pay and to retired reservists receiving 
hospitalization.466 
As a result of this in-between approach, the military occasionally 
prosecutes inactive military members for conduct wholly disconnected 
from the military.467 For example, in United States v. Larrabee, a retired 
Marine Corps sergeant working as the manager of a bar was court-
martialed for sexually assaulting a bartender.468 And in United States 
v. Dinger, another retired Marine Corps sergeant faced a court-martial 
for possession of child pornography.469 A recent Navy corruption 
scandal also put significant numbers of retirees at risk for court-
martial.470 
The constitutionality of these prosecutions remains unclear. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has affirmed convictions in 
Larrabee and Dinger, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in 
these cases.471 In contrast, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal 
Appeals struck down a retiree’s prosecution under the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment because Congress subjected active 
duty retirees to broader military criminal jurisdiction than reserve 
 
 464. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 448–50 (1987). 
 465. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2) (2012). 
 466. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4)–(5). 
 467. The Navy Times reports that at least eight retirees have been charged under the UCMJ 
by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Army did not report its numbers. Geoff Ziezulewicz, 
Court-Martialing Retirees? ‘Fat Leonard’ Cloud Still Looms for Many Current and Former Sailors, 
NAVY TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/11/20/court-
martialing-retirees-fat-leonard-cloud-still-looms-over-hundreds/ [https://perma.cc/72YQ-82UW]. 
 468. United States v. Larrabee, No. 201700075, 2017 WL 5712245, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 
Nov. 28, 2017), aff’d, 78 M.J. 107 (C.A.A.F. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019). 
 469. United States v. Dinger, 77 M.J. 447, 448 (C.A.A.F.), reconsideration denied, 78 M.J. 91 
(C.A.A.F. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 492 (2018). 
 470. See discussion supra note 467. 
 471. See sources cited supra note 468–469. 
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retirees.472 Larrabee has also sought collateral relief from a U.S. 
District Court.473 
For reservists, the status-based universal jurisdiction outlined 
in Solorio v. United States seems inappropriate as the constitutional 
ceiling.474 Because the U.S. Army Reserve is a federally organized 
militia, military reservists have a strong argument that courts should 
apply the criminal procedure guarantees that apply to members of the 
militia. The Constitution clearly evidences an intent to exempt part-
time soldiers from military law except when in actual service.475 Why 
should permitting Congress to maintain a federally organized militia 
also allow Congress to subject federal militiamen to military law 
outside the jurisdictional restrictions imposed by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments?  That compounds one constitutional error with another. 
As applied to the issues in Larrabee and Dinger, this analysis 
suggests two conclusions. First, whether the federal government may 
court-martial retirees of a regular component depends on whether 
someone who is retired from active service still constitutes part of the 
regular forces. I am not sure of the answer to this issue. One answer 
might be that retirees are militia because, although they may be 
recalled to active duty, their primary occupation no longer consists of 
being a soldier. And treating retirees as active duty soldiers creates 
tension with fundamental constitutional rights.476 History, however, 
may offer a different answer; there is authority for the proposition that 
retired members of the military remain in the regular forces despite 
 
 472. United States v. Begani, No. 201800082, 2019 WL 3542910, *9–10 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 
July 31, 2019). 
 473. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Collateral Review of Unconstitutional 
Trial by Court-Martial) at 9, Larrabee v. McPherson, No. 1:19-cv-00654 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.204940/gov.uscourts.dcd.204940.1.0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F86Z-RR66]. 
 474. This argument is premised on accepting that the difference between a member of the 
“army” and the “militia” is whether person serves full-time or part-time. For those who believe 
that the dividing line between armies and militia is whether the forces are volunteers or 
conscripted, my argument against universal jurisdiction would apply to conscripts, mutatis 
mutandis. 
 475. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a . . . crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising . . . in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger.”). Federal statutory law recognizes that members 
of the armed forces who are not on active duty may constitute part of the militia. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 247(a)(3) (2012). 
 476. For example, Article 88 of the UCMJ prohibits a commissioned officer from “us[ing] 
contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, [and certain other 
officials].” 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2012). While this Article may be a reasonable disciplinary provision for 
active duty forces, this provision raises serious freedom of speech concerns when applied to retired 
members who have reentered civilian life and whose chance of serving on active duty again is 
almost purely hypothetical.  
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their lack of active service.477 Second, contrary to the Navy-Marine 
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion, there may be a rational basis 
to distinguish active duty and reserve retirees. If retirees from regular 
components remain in the regular forces, then the narrower 
circumstances in which the federal government may subject retired 
reservists to military criminal jurisdiction may be compelled by the 
Fifth Amendment’s narrower militia exception.478  
Regardless of the status of active duty retirees, reserve retirees 
are undoubtedly militia. For the reasons explained in Section II.B, 
active reservists are militiamen because they are part-time soldiers. 
Moving from a drilling reserve member to a member of the retired 
reserve does not transform a reservist into a professional soldier. It 
moves the reservist in the opposite direction—toward being a full-time 
civilian. 
Thus, again, we see that the departure from original 
constitutional design raises difficult doctrinal questions. In some cases, 
a court can only produce originalist judgments by compensating for 
previous deviations from original constitutional design. Here, it is 
unlikely that federal courts would ever broadly declare the army 
reserve in violation of the Militia Clauses. But if a court accepts the 
legitimacy of the army reserve while also applying the rule that 
Congress can extend plenary military criminal jurisdiction over all 
army members (active duty and reserve), then it will reach a result at 
odds with the plain text of the Fifth Amendment. That Amendment 
allows the federal government to apply military law to part-time 
soldiers only in narrow circumstances. Proper recognition of the army 
reserve as a constitutional “militia” suggests that courts may need to 
narrow the scope of Congress’s power to apply military law to reservists. 
Only then would the scope of military criminal jurisdiction remain 
consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s narrow militia exception.479 
More broadly, this suggests that courts need to be careful in how they 
approach constitutional construction when engaged in second-best 
originalism. Selective usage of originalism can produce judgments 
further at odds with the original meaning of the Constitution.  
 
 477. 1 WINTHROP, supra note 127, at 87 n.27. 
 478. I do not mean to defend every particular of Article 2 of the UCMJ. If my argument is 
correct, then the provision permitting the federal government to court-martial reservists receiving 
hospitalization, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(5) (2012), may be unconstitutional to the extent that it 
authorizes such proceedings during peacetime. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 479. Cf. United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 7 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that Senator Lindsay 
Graham’s appointment to the Air Force Court of Appeals violated the Incompatibility Clause, 
while refusing to rule more broadly on whether a member of Congress’s commission in the military 
violated the Clause). 
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CONCLUSION 
The modern organization of the armed forces heavily deviates 
from how the Framers originally divided the military power of the 
United States between the federal government, the states, and the 
people. The federal government maintains large reserve forces, which 
are, in essence, an organized national militia. And through the draft, 
the federal government has immediate access to the entire manpower 
of the United States, without any role for state governments. In short, 
the current system concentrates enormous military power into the 
hands of the federal government without the original federalism-based 
checks on that power. And the increase of federal power at state expense 
has concentrated military power into the hands of the president and 
diminished the power of Congress over the armed forces. 
But understanding the Framers’ original division is important 
to many contemporary debates over how to apply the Constitution to 
questions involving the military. With the destruction of federalism-
based checks on military power, the only checks and balances are 
provided by separation of powers. Understanding this may lead us to 
rebalance the division of power between the president and Congress to 
compensate for the additional power taken from the states. Moreover, 
many questions remain about the constitutional limits of the federal 
government to institute a draft and to govern reserve forces. By 
understanding the military system’s changes over time, we may be able 
to better demarcate an appropriate modern limit to the federal 
government’s power to raise and govern military forces. 
